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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the increasing diversity of immigrants has
fueled fears over the fragmentation of America.  Some commentators have
taken extreme positions explicitly criticizing the changing racial composi-
tion of the United States, such as Peter Brimelow, who contends that immi-
grants undermine the nation’s White “ethnic core.”2  Others, like Samuel P.
Huntington, have avoided the crucible of race by framing arguments in
terms of culture, warning that Mexican immigration threatens a cohesive
“American” national identity defined by “Anglo Protestant culture.”3 While
these arguments ring of racism, reflecting an all too familiar angst that aliens
are splintering America,4 concerns about social cohesion have also been
raised by liberal academics, such as political scientist Robert Putnam, author
of the bestseller Bowling Alone, who argues that “immigration and ethnic
diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital.”5  Even the
general public seems concerned with social cohesion, as nearly half the U.S.
population agrees that “the growing number of newcomers from other coun-
tries threaten traditional American customs and values.”6
Anxiety over the social fragmentation of America has become apparent
not only through popular books, social science research, and public polls,
but also through the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.  The
2 PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION
DISASTER 10, 232 (1995) (arguing that “the central challenge for modern, diversifying socie-
ties” is the creation “of a new, broader sense of ‘we’”).
3 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL
IDENTITY 221-56 (2005) (blaming Latinos, especially Mexican-Americans, for the “cultural
bifurcation” of the United States); see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE DISUNITING OF
AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY (1992) (arguing that multiculturalism
is tearing apart the nation); PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE DEATH OF THE WEST: HOW DYING
POPULATIONS AND IMMIGRANT INVASIONS IMPERIL OUR COUNTRY AND CIVILIZATION (2002);
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE THIRD WORLD INVASION AND CONQUEST
OF AMERICA (2006).
4 Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, National Identity in a Multicultural Nation: The
Challenge of Immigration Law and Immigrants, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (2005) (critiquing
Samuel Huntington’s book, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL IDEN-
TITY); Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional Immigration
Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1951 (1996) (book review) (reviewing Peter Brimelow’s book,
Alien Nation, and arguing that “us[ing] immigration policy to make America more white . . .
will splinter America like nothing else”).
5 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 138, 148, 150-51 (2000).
6 Benjamin Richard Knoll, Understanding the “New Nativism”: Causes and Conse-
quences for Immigration Policy Attitudes in the United States (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Iowa), available at http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/532 (citing a 2006 study by
the Pew Research Center and Pew Hispanic Center).  Forty eight percent of respondents agreed
with this statement. Id. (citing same Pew study). Moreover, 50% of respondents agreed that
“our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence.” Id. (citing same
Pew study).
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Court has long decried classifications that “‘lead to a politics of racial hos-
tility,’” 7 with swing Justices in particular voicing this concern.  For example,
Justice O’Connor has cautioned that benign racial classifications contribute
to “an escalation of racial hostility and conflict”8 and that “[r]acial gerry-
mandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing
racial factions.”9  These statements echo Justice Powell’s concerns in Bakke
that affirmative action would “exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms
rather than alleviate them.”10  Drawing on such opinions, Reva Sigel high-
lights a novel perspective on equal protection that is “concerned with threats
to social cohesion,” which she calls “the antibalkanization perspective.”11
This perspective has also emerged in the context of classifications
based on immigration status.  In Plyler v. Doe, which held that undocu-
mented immigrant children have the right to an elementary public education,
the Supreme Court relied heavily on a social cohesion rationale, reasoning
that public schools help “maintain[ ] the fabric of our society,”12 serving as
“an important socializing institution, imparting those shared values through
which social order and stability are maintained.”13  While concerns over bal-
kanization appear primarily within equal protection cases, Kenji Yoshino
shows how the same concern with social cohesion manifests on a much
larger scale.  He describes a broad shift by the Supreme Court away from
traditional equal protection analysis altogether and towards a liberty-dignity
analysis as a response to “pluralism anxiety” –anxiety about too many
“new” and “newly visible” groups.14
Since concerns about cohesion based on race and based on immigration
tend to go hand in hand, immigration scholars have long noted the need to
take them seriously.15  This Article contributes to an emerging body of schol-
arship related to the integration of immigrants by examining how current
immigration policies deepen or diminish social divides and presenting a
framework for analyzing proposed immigration reforms in terms of their
impact on social cohesion.16  Specifically, the Article draws on social psy-
7 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
8 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(holding that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to benign racial classifications), over-
ruled by Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny
should be applied to federal laws using benign racial classifications).
9 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
10 Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298-99 (1978).
11 Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L. J. 1278, 1278 (2011).
12 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
13 Id. at 222 n.20.
14 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011).
15 See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism:
Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Soci-
ety, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 869 (1993) (arguing that “[d]espite tactical exaggerations by as-
similationists, conflict and separatism cannot simply be brushed aside”).
16 See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRA-
TION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); Lauren Gilbert, Citizenship, Civic Vir-
tue, and Immigrant Integration: The Enduring Power of Community-Based Norms, 27 YALE L.
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chological research regarding the relationship between social categorization
and intergroup relations to propose a method for analyzing how immigration
reforms might impact intergroup bias.
Part II of the Article frames immigration law as a system of social cate-
gorization, arguing that categories based on “legal” and “illegal” immigra-
tion status are fuzzy and fluid, but enforcement policies such as
militarization of the border, criminalization of immigration violations, and
expansion of removal operations render the boundary between these catego-
ries more salient.  This approach contravenes most categorization-based ap-
proaches to reducing intergroup bias, which emphasize decreasing the
salience of categorical boundaries.
Part III explains the relationship between social categorization and in-
tergroup bias, drawing on social psychological research to argue that ingroup
favoritism is particularly likely to lead to outgroup hostility in the U.S. im-
migration context.  This Part then sets forth three categorization-based strat-
egies for reducing intergroup bias that involve reducing the salience of
category boundaries: (1) decategorization, which proposes eroding or eras-
ing group boundaries so that people perceive each other as individuals rather
than as members of any given group; (2) recategorization, which proposes
recombining group members as part of a new, more inclusive “superordi-
nate” group and thereby replacing “us” and “them” with a shared sense of
“we”; and (3) crossed-categorization, which proposes bringing out multiple
group identities in order to undermine the usefulness of simple
categorizations.17
Part IV analyzes how specific immigration policies contravene or sup-
port these three categorization-based strategies.  Specifically, Part IV(A) ar-
gues that immigration policies in recent decades have generally promoted
collective anonymity and depersonalization of undocumented immigrants,
but recent policy changes encouraging prosecutorial discretion represent a
shift towards greater individuation and a first step towards decategorization.
Part IV(B) explores the idea of recategorization through the creation of a
common “American” identity, focusing on the challenge posed by the per-
sistent association between American identity and Whiteness.  This robust
association between nationality and race underscores the limitations of legal-
ization programs that alter only legal status as a means of recategorization.
Part IV(C) examines how past immigration reforms have supported a narrow
form of crossed categorization by creating special categories for “victims”
who are treated as distinct from the general category of “illegal aliens.”
& POL’Y REV. 335 (2009); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 2037, 2071-74 (2008); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a
Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219
(2007); Laura Spitz, The Evolving Architecture of North American Integration, 80 U. COLO. L.
REV. 735 (2009).
17 Samuel L. Gaertner, John F. Dovidio, & Melissa A. Houlette, Social Categorization, in
THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION, 530-38 (John F.
Dovidio, Miles Hewstone, Peter Glick, & Victoria M. Esses, eds., 2010); Richard Crisp,
Prejudice and Perceiving Multiple Identities, in id. at 510-21.
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This section critiques the limitations inherent in this approach, which en-
dorses a victim/criminal dichotomy, and proposes pursuing crossed categori-
zation by highlighting other types of social identities, including worker-
based and student-based identities, as ways to destabilize the concept of “il-
legal” personhood.  The Article contends that immigration reforms that pro-
mote the labor rights of undocumented immigrants and their access to
education promote crossed categorization and thereby have the potential to
reduce intergroup bias.
In sum, applying social categorization theories to the context of U.S.
immigration paints a nuanced picture of how the social categories that we
create through our immigration laws shape our identity as a nation.  While
immigration reforms are often discussed in terms of tit for tat compromises
between different factions, the present approach provides a more coherent
way of analyzing prospective reforms and invites further exploration about
how different reforms may work together – simultaneously or sequentially –
to improve social cohesion.  The social psychological perspective presented
in this Article may also help legal scholars and policy makers generate com-
pletely new proposals for immigration reforms that improve intergroup
relations.
I. CONSTRUCTING FUZZY CATEGORIES BASED ON IMMIGRATION STATUS
AND THE POROUS BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THEM
Since the term “illegal” normally refers to specific acts and not to the
person who commits them, the concept of “illegal aliens” is inherently elu-
sive.18  Various scholars have traced how the category of “illegal aliens”
began to emerge as a social identity in the 1920s and 1930s through actions
such as the more rigid demarcation of the boundary between the U.S. and
Mexico, the criminalization of entry into the U.S. at non-designated loca-
tions in 1929, and the mass deportation of Mexicans that same year.19  Mex-
ico also participated in this process by constructing U.S. citizens as “the
other” and taking steps to reinforce Mexican national identity in the border
region, such as by implementing programs to prevent the encroachment of
the English language.20  Legal status and race became intertwined in this
process of constructing difference.  Mexican immigrants, following in the
footsteps of immigrants from China and other parts of Asia, became “racial-
ized in ways that emphasized the group’s foreignness, racial inferiority and
18 See ROXANNE LYNN DOTY, ANTI-IMMIGRANTISM IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES: STATE-
CRAFT, DESIRE AND THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 41 (2003) (noting that using the term “ille-
gal” in this way suggests the exclusion of people from the very realm of rights).
19 Id. at 67-69; JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER: THE RISE OF THE “ILLEGAL
ALIEN” AND THE REMAKING OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 12 (2010) (explaining that the U.S.
government “helped to create the illegal through the construction of the boundary and the
expansion of the federal government’s enforcement capacity”).
20 DOTY, supra note 18, at 69. R
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racial unassimilability.”21  As Lina Newton explains, the term “illegals”
came to be understood as referring to Mexicans who “crossed the border in
violation of the law and with the intent or likelihood of violating further
laws.”22  By 1950, the concept of “illegal aliens” had infiltrated the courts,
resulting in the first judicial decisions that used the term “illegal” in refer-
ence to immigrants.23
Our current immigration scheme, based on the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952 (“INA”), maps out multiple tiers of legal status.  The most
basic classifications include U.S. citizens, permanent residents, and tempo-
rary immigrants (technically called “nonimmigrants”).  Comprising the neg-
ative space of this design are the twelve million individuals without any
legal status living in the U.S., whom this article refers to as “undocumented
immigrants.”  One can view these different statuses as points along a spec-
trum of social membership, with citizens obviously having the highest level
of membership and undocumented immigrants having the lowest.  Other
forms of immigration status, such as asylum, temporary protected status, and
withholding of removal, also fit somewhere along this spectrum, although
their locations are harder to pin down.  This spectrum represents a sliding
scale, as individuals are able to both gain and lose status in a variety of
ways.
While it is difficult for undocumented immigrants to gain legal status,
especially if they entered the United States without inspection, limited chan-
nels for legalization do exist.  Those who initially entered the U.S. lawfully
and then lost their status (for example, by overstaying a visa) can still adjust
their status to permanent residents if they have a spouse, parent, or child who
is a U.S. citizen.  Some who entered illegally can adjust their status if they
qualify under former INA § 245(i), which requires an immigrant visa peti-
tion to have been filed for them prior to April 30, 2001.  Undocumented
immigrants can also acquire legal status through asylum, grants of discre-
tionary relief (such as cancellation of removal) by an immigration judge, or
by applying for special visas available to victims of domestic violence, traf-
ficking or certain other types of crimes.  As the Supreme Court recognized
in Plyler v. Doe, “the illegal alien of today may well be the legal alien of
tomorrow.”24 At the same time, permanent residents can lose their status in a
21 LINA NEWTON, ILLEGAL, ALIEN OR IMMIGRANT: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM
13 (2008).
22 Id. at 146.
23 NEVINS, supra note 19, at 119. R
24 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 207 (1982). In fact, the Plyler Court repeatedly noted the
potential transience of undocumented status. See id. at 208 n.4 (noting that the plaintiff’s
expert testified that “fifty to sixty per cent . . . of current legal alien workers were formerly
illegal aliens,” and that a defense witness acknowledged that “undocumented children” some-
times manage to “adjust their status through marriage”); id. at 222 n.20 (“the courts below
concluded that many [undocumented children] will remain here permanently and that some
indeterminate number will eventually become citizens”); id. at 226 (“[T]here is no assurance
that a child subject to deportation will ever be deported.  An illegal entrant might be granted
federal permission to continue to reside in this country, or even to become a citizen.”); id. at
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLA\15\HLA105.txt unknown Seq: 7 27-JUN-12 11:03
2012] “Regrouping America” 135
wide variety of ways, from a relatively minor conviction, such as petty theft,
to a trip outside the U.S. that lasts longer than 180 days.
The categories of “legal” and “illegal” immigrant are also fluid be-
cause Congress and the courts continuously redefine their boundaries.  Con-
gress, for example, constantly changes the criteria for determining when
permanent residents should lose their status.  Most notably, immigration
laws passed in 1996 dramatically increased the grounds of removal, espe-
cially by expanding the definition of an “aggravated felony.”  Since the ex-
panded grounds of removal applied retroactively, permanent residents
suddenly became deportable for past crimes that were not deportable of-
fenses at the time that they were committed.  Similarly, decisions by the BIA
and the federal courts of appeal interpreting the INA can instantaneously
redefine who is subject to removal from the United States.  For instance, the
federal courts of appeal now routinely interpret whether convictions under
specific state statutes constitute removable offenses under the INA, applying
complex analytical methods developed by the Supreme Court.25  Such case-
by-case determinations shape who is “legal” on a daily basis.
In addition, undocumented immigrants in the U.S. occupy a liminal le-
gal space because they hold certain important rights while lacking others.
As Linda Bosniak explains, they carry dual identities as “juridically recog-
nized person[s] and as illegal border violator[s].”26  For example, undocu-
mented immigrants have the same rights as citizens in criminal proceedings,
the right to sue in tort and contract, the right to divorce, the right to bring
employment lawsuits, the right to sue for workmen’s compensation, the right
to a public elementary education, and the right to own property.27  Moreover,
undocumented immigrants are considered “employees” within the meaning
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA).28  On the other hand, they lack the right to engage in employ-
230 (“the record is clear that many of the undocumented children disabled by this classifica-
tion will remain in this country indefinitely, and some will become lawful residents or citizens
of the United States”).
25 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); see also Pooja R. Dadhania, Note, The
Categorical Approach for Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude After Silva-Trevino, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 313 (2011); Doug Keller, Causing Mischief for Taylor’s Categorical Approach: Apply-
ing “Legal Imagination” to Duenas-Alvarez, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 625 (2011); Jennifer Lee
Koh, The Whole Better Than The Sum? The Categorical Approach and the Immigration Conse-
quences of Criminal Convictions, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. (forthcoming).
26 Linda Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 1006 (1988); see also Lori A.
Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the
Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 347 (2001) (“Undocumented workers by
definition occupy a precarious position in U.S. society: their very presence at the workplace is
at the same time unlawful and necessary to perform the most difficult work at the lowest
wages.”).
27 Bosniak, supra note 26, at 1006. R
28 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (holding that undocumented workers are
“employees” under the NRLA, although their remedies might be limited).
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ment,29 the right to back pay or reinstatement if fired for an unlawful rea-
son,30 and the right to non-discrimination based on their legal status.31  They
are barred from most public benefits32 and face significant challenges in eve-
ryday life, as more and more states pass laws to prevent them from renting
housing,33 qualifying for in-state tuition,34 and obtaining drivers licenses.35
Most obviously, undocumented immigrants face the constant risk of being
deported from the United States.
By being simultaneously included and excluded within this maze of
laws, undocumented immigrants inhabit an amorphous legal landscape.  To
the extent that “illegal alien” exists as a legal category, it is a category with
porous boundaries, through which rights ebb and flow.  Given the fuzzy and
fluid nature of categories based on “legal” and “illegal” status, the policies
that the government pursues play a critical role in shaping the boundary
29 IRCA made it illegal for employers to knowingly hire an undocumented alien. Prior to
the passage of IRCA in 1986, undocumented aliens did have the right to enter freely into
employment contracts.
30 Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (holding that an
undocumented worker fired for union organizing was not entitled to back pay); see also Gar-
cia, Ghost Workers, at 750 (asserting that Hoffman “denies that the work performed by un-
documented workers has any value”); Ruben J. Garcia, Across the Borders: Immigrant Status
and Identity in Law and Latcrit Theory, 55 FLA. L. REV. 511, 516 (2003) (noting that undocu-
mented workers are technically covered by the NLRA but are unlikely to obtain reinstatement
of their job as a remedy).
31 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 does not prohibit discrimination based on legal status).  Undocumented immi-
grants also fall outside the antidiscrimination provisions of the Immigration Control and Re-
form Act of 1986.  8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(B), (b)(2) (1986).
32 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal stat-
ute limiting senior Medicare benefits to aliens who had been admitted for permanent residence
and had resided in the United States for at least five years); see also Paul Meehan, Combatting
Restrictions on Immigrant Access to Public Benefits: A Human Rights Perspective, 11 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 389 (1997); Jeffrey T. Kullgren, Restrictions on Undocumented Immigrants’ Ac-
cess to Health Services: The Public Health Implications of Welfare Reform, 93 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1630 (2003) (noting that the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcil-
iation Act of 1996 declared undocumented immigrants ineligible for “any retirement, welfare,
health, disability . . . or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are
provided”).
33 See, e.g., Clifton R. Gruhn, Filling the Gaps Left by Congress or Violating Federal
Rights: An Analysis of Local Ordinances Restricting Undocumented Immigrants’ Access to
Housing, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AMER. L. REV. 529 (2008).
34 Ten states have passed laws permitting certain undocumented students who have at-
tended and graduated from their primary and secondary schools to pay the same tuition as their
in-state classmates at public institutions of higher education. The states are California, CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2007); Illinois, ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/7e-5 (2003); Kansas, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 76-731a (2004); Nebraska, NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 85-502 (2006); New Mexico,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-18-7.10 (2005); New York, N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6301 (McKinney 2002);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3242 (2007); Texas, TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.057 (West
2001), amended by TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.057 (West 2005); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 53B-8-106 (West 2002); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.14.012 (2003); see also De-
nise Oas, Immigration and Higher Education: The Debate Over In-State Tuition, 79 UMKC L.
REV. 877 (2011).
35 See Maria Pabon Lopez, More Than a License to Drive: State Restrictions on the Use of
Driver’s Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91 (2004) (discussing three types of state
laws that restrict noncitizens’ access to driver’s licenses).
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between them.  In recent decades, the U.S. has aggressively pursued immi-
gration policies aimed at reinforcing the salience of the boundary between
“legal” and “illegal” immigrants.  Such policies include militarization of
the U.S.-Mexico border starting in the 1990s and culminating in the con-
struction of a massive barricade;36 vast expansion of detention and removal
operations, resulting in the removal of nearly 400,000 people per year;37
criminalization of immigration violations such as unlawful entry, which now
comprise 54% of all federal prosecutions;38 and eliciting the support of state
and local governments in immigration enforcement through 287(g) agree-
ments and programs like Secure Communities, which involve the police in
screening for immigration violations during routine arrests.39
Policies that attempt to fortify the boundary between “legal” and “ille-
gal” status have done little to promote social cohesion within the United
States.  On the contrary, such policies have gone hand-in-hand with the rise
of anti-immigrant and nativist movements, which other scholars have dis-
cussed at length.40  The following section provides a social psychological
framework for understanding how categorization plays a critical role in the
development of intergroup bias and conflict.  By constructing social catego-
ries based on “legal” and “illegal” status and then pursuing polices that
make blurry boundaries more rigid, the U.S. appears to be heading down a
path that invites greater friction and factionalism.  Indeed, the categoriza-
tion-based strategies for reducing such bias, discussed below, focus on re-
ducing the salience of boundaries, rather than making them more distinct.
36 NEVINS, supra note 19; NEWTON, supra note 21, at 115-18 (noting that portrayals of the R
border as “a breeding ground for smugglers, drugs, violence, and generalized crime” made it
even easier for Congressmen to characterize undocumented immigrants as inherently criminal
during the 1996 debates on immigration reform).
37 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), News Release, DHS/ICE Reveal
Highest Immigration Enforcement Numbers on Record in Fiscal Year 2010 (Oct. 8, 2010),
available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1010/101008washingtondc.htm (noting that
392,000 people were removed from the United States in fiscal year 2010).
38 New Data on Federal Court Prosecutions Reveal Non-Violent Immigration Prosecutions
Up, Immigr. POL’Y CENTER, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/new-data-federal-
court-prosecutions-reveal-non-violent-immigration-prosecutions (last visited Sept. 4, 2011).
39 See, e.g., Yolanda Vazquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral
Consequence of the Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54
HOW. L.J. 639, 658-54 (2010) (discussing the entwinement of immigration enforcement and
the criminal justice system, including 287(g) agreements and the Secure Communities pro-
gram); Jennifer Chacon, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 129, 148-50 (2010) (discussing 287(g) agreements and Secure Communities).
40 See, e.g. DOTY, supra note 18; JUAN PEREA, IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM R
AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES (1996); PETER SCHRAG, NOT FIT
FOR OUR SOCIETY: IMMIGRATION AND NATIVISM IN AMERICA (2011).
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II. SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS
A. The Relationship Between Social Categorization, Intergroup Bias, and
Intergroup Conflict
Social categorization is essential to our ability to function in a complex
world.  As Gordon Allport declared in 1954, “[t]he human mind must think
with the aid of categories.”41  In his groundbreaking book, The Nature of
Prejudice, Allport argued that prejudice was a “natural byproduct of human
cognition and, in particular, of categorization.”42  An influential article writ-
ten by British social psychologist Henri Tajfel in 1969 further developed the
idea that social categorization creates the cognitive basis for prejudice.43
Tajfel’s research showed that the mere act of categorization had such cogni-
tive power that even meaningless groups (called “minimal” groups by social
psychologists) can trigger bias, eliciting preference for ingroup members (in-
dividuals included within one’s own group) over outgroup members (indi-
viduals excluded from one’s own group).44
Tajfel’s experiments with minimal groups laid the foundation for social
identity theory and self-categorization theory.  The concept of social iden-
tity, which Tajfel defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which
derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups)
together with the emotional significance attached to that membership,”45 is
key to understanding how a system of social categorizations “creates and
defines an individual’s own place in society.”46  Tajfel reasoned that social
identity rests on favorable comparisons of ingroup members with outgroup
members, which serve our underlying need for self-esteem.47  In other
words, social comparisons and discriminatory actions satisfy the need for
positive self-identity by enhancing one’s sense of status.48  Identifying with
our ingroup creates a sense of belonging and security,49 while differentiating
our ingroup from the outgroup satisfies our desire for distinctiveness.50
Tajfel developed social identity theory to explain how people’s beliefs
about the relationships between groups, such as their relative status, stability,
41 GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 20 (1954).
42 Susan T. Fiske & Ann Marie Russell, Cognitive Processes, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK
OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 17, at 116. R
43 Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. SOC. ISSUES 79-97 (1969).
44 Henri Tajfel and John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in SOC.
PSY. INTERGROUP REL. (W.G. Austin & S. Worchel, eds.) (originally published in 1979).
45 Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior, 13 SOC. SCI. INFO. 65, 69 (1974).
46 Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization, in INTRODUCTION TO SOC. PSY. 293 (S. Moscovici
ed., 1972) (English translation).
47 Tajfel, supra note 45; J.C. Turner, Social Comparison and Social Identity: Some Pros- R
pects for Intergroup Behavior, 5 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1975).
48 Tajfel, supra note 45; Turner, supra note 46. R
49 Gaertner, Dovidio, & Houlette, supra note 17, at 528. R
50 Crisp, supra note 17, at 510.  We seek distinctiveness because it reduces uncertainty in R
social situations, providing prescriptive norms to guide our behavior and helping us predict
how ingroup and outgroup members will behave. Id.
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and legitimacy, influence how they seek a positive social identity.51  Subse-
quently, Tajfel’s student, John Turner, and his colleagues extended social
identity theory through the development of self-categorization theory, which
describes how social categorization transforms group members’ representa-
tions of themselves into prototypes of their groups, such that they “perceive
themselves as exemplars of the group rather than as unique individuals.”52
The cognitive impact of social categorization into ingroups and out-
groups is enormous.  Identifying with a group leads us to minimize differ-
ences among ingroup members while exaggerating differences between
ingroup and outgroup members.53  We remember more information about
ways that ingroup members are similar to us and outgroup members are
different from us.54  Moreover, we associate the typical characteristics of the
ingroup with ourselves, a process known as “self stereotyping.”55 At the
same time, we expect our ingroup members to share our attitudes and values
more than outgroup members.56  We even attribute secondary emotions that
are unique to human beings (e.g. affection, pride, and remorse) more to in-
group members than to outgroup members, suggesting that we see ingroup
members as more human.57  These cognitive processes all cultivate positive
associations with our ingroup and more helpful behaviors towards them than
towards the outgroup.58  They also reflect how cognitive representations of
the self and the ingroup become “inextricably linked.”59  Research indicates
that this mental fusion of self and social group occurs not only explicitly (i.e.
consciously), but also implicitly (i.e. unconsciously).60
Recent studies in implicit social categorization provide new insights
about how the relative dominance or subordinance of a social group influ-
ences attitudes towards the ingroup and outgroup.61  While members of high
status groups show ingroup favoritism both explicitly and implicitly, mem-
bers of low status groups often show ingroup favoritism explicitly but not
implicitly.62  For example, results from Implicit Association Tests reveal that
51 Michael A. Hogg & Deborah J. Terry, Social Identity and Self-Categorization Processes
in Organizational Contexts, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 121, 123 (2000).
52 Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Self and Identity, 1001 ANN. N.Y. ACAD.
SCI. 177, 180 (2003).
53 John F. Dovidio, et al., Commonality and the Complexity of “We”: Social Attitudes and
Social Change, 13 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY. REV. 3, 5 (2009).
54 Id.
55 Devos & Banaji, supra note 52, at 180.
56 Id.
57 Jacques-Philippe Leyens et al., The Emotional Side of Prejudice: The Attribution of
Secondary Emotions to Ingroups and Outgroups, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY. REV. 186-97
(2000).
58 Devos & Banaji, supra note 52, at 180.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 180-82.
61 Jim Sidanius & Felicia Pratto, Social Dominance Theory: A New Synthesis, in SOCIAL
DOMINANCE 31-57 (1999).
62 Brian Mullen et al., Ingroup Bias As a Function of Salience, Relevance and Status: An
Integration, 22 EURO. J. SOC. PSY. 103-122 (1992); see also Charles M. Judd et al., Stereo-
types and Ethnocentrism: Diverging Interethnic Perceptions of African American and White
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Blacks outwardly exhibit a strong preference for Blacks over Whites as a
group, but implicitly show no preference for their ingroup.63  One explana-
tion for this phenomenon is that disadvantaged group members make an ef-
fort to report positive attitudes towards their ingroup on explicit measures
because they are striving to achieve a positive social identity, but the implicit
measures reveal that they have actually internalized the lower social status of
their group.64  This explanation is consistent with “system justification the-
ory,” which predicts a tendency to justify the status quo, even when one
belongs to a socially disadvantaged group.
The hierarchical nature of social groups is also relevant to determining
when ingroup favoritism will lead to outgroup derogation or hostility.65
Studies examining the conditions where outgroup hostility occurs have
found that the relative social status of the different groups and the context
both play critical roles.66  Perceiving the ingroup as powerful and enjoying
strong collective support from fellow ingroup members tends to produce an-
ger towards the outgroup, which potently predicts hostile impulses, includ-
ing inclinations to confront, oppose and attack the outgroup.67  Emotions
other than anger, such as fear and distrust of the outgroup, may also lead to
hostility, although the link is less clear than for anger.68
Ingroup identification is also associated with outgroup derogation in
situations where the ingroup endorses ideas of moral superiority that are
incompatible with tolerance for difference and that justify domination of the
outgroup.69  “In complex national ingroups, institutions, rules and laws take
on a character of moral authority, and since ethnic majorities tend to be in
control of national institutions, they are also more likely to endorse claims of
moral superiority.”70  Moreover, ingroup favoritism is associated with out-
American Youth, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY. 460-81 (1995) (finding that African Ameri-
cans often display more ethnocentric intergroup perceptions than do white Americans).
63 Devos & Banaji, supra note 52, at 196. R
64 Id.
65 For studies showing that ingroup favoritism does not inevitably entail hostility to out-
groups, see C. Staerkle et al., Ethnic Majority-Minority Assymetry and Attitudes Towards Im-
migrants Across 11 Nations, 30 PSICOLOGIA POLITICA (POL. PSY.) 7, 10-11 (2005); see also
M.B. Brewer, The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate, 55 J. SOC. IS-
SUES 429 (1999); J. Duckitt & T. Mphuthing, Group Identification and Intergroup Attitudes: A
Longitudinal Analysis in South Africa, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY. 80 (1998).
66 M. Ros, C. Huici & A. Gomez, Comparative Identity, Category Salience and Inter-
group Relations, in SOCIAL IDENTITY PROCESSES 81-95 (D. Capozza & R. Brown, eds., 2000).
67 Diane M. Mackie, Thierry Devos & Eliot R. Smith, Intergroup Emotions: Explaining
Offensive Action Tendencies in an Intergroup Context, 79 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY. 602,
613 (2000).  This study focused on behavioral intentions rather than actual behaviors, which
are more constrained by situational factors or social sanctions.  While behavioral intentions
tend to predict behaviors in a general sense (as offensive or defensive), it is difficult to know
what precise act will result from the impulse.
68 M.B. Brewer, Superordinate Goals Versus Superordinate Identity As Bases of Inter-
group Cooperation, in SOCIAL IDENTITY PROCESSES 117-32 (D. Capozza & R. Brown, eds.,
2000) (finding that fear and distrust of the outgroup lead to hostility).  But see Mackie, Devos
& Smith, supra note 67 (finding no clear association between fear and outgroup hostility).
69 Brewer, supra note 65; J. SIDANIUS AND F. PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTER- R
GROUP THEORY OF  HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION (1999).
70 Staerkle et al., supra note 65, at 11. R
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group hostility in situations involving a scarcity of resources and perceived
realistic threat.71  Salient group memberships and the appraisal of situations
in terms of their consequences for the ingroup are particularly likely to trig-
ger the impulse towards outgroup hostility.72
All of these factors associated with the transformation of ingroup favor-
itism into outgroup hostility exist in the U.S. immigration context.  First,
U.S. citizens clearly wield more power as a group than legal immigrants and
are far more powerful than undocumented immigrants.  Second, the amount
of anger aroused by issues of immigration reflects festering hostility that has
repeatedly exploded into outright violence.73  Third, the language of moral
superiority pervades immigration debates, which alternatively cast the un-
documented as undeserving others or outright criminals.74  Finally, nearly
half of Americans believe that immigrants are taking scarce resources, in-
cluding precious jobs and health care.75  The presence of all these factors sets
the stage for Americans’ ingroup favoritism to turn into hostility against im-
migrants, especially those who are undocumented.  The following section
addresses categorization-based strategies for reducing intergroup bias, which
71 Duckitt & Mphuthing, supra note 65. R
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., Bill Schneider, Anger Over Immigration Plan Surprises GOP Senators, CNN,
May 29, 2007, http://edition.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/05/29/bush.immigration/index.html;
Jacques Billeaud & Amanda Lee Myers, Arizona Law Comes After Years of Mounting An-
ger, ABC NEWS, July 25, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/arizona-immigration-law-years-
mounting-anger/story?id=11247140; SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, Anti-Immigrant Cli-
mate Fueling Violence Against Latinos in N.Y. County, Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.
splcenter.org/get-informed/news/splc-report-anti-immigrant-climate-fueling-violence-against-
latinos-in-ny-county; Southern Poverty Law Center, Immigrant Backlash: Hatecrimes Against
Latinos Flourish, Intelligence Report, Winter 2007 Issue No. 128, http://www.splcenter.org/
get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2007/winter/immigration-backlash.  Nor is
anger over immigration unique to the United States. See, e.g., Christopher Hope, Frank Field:
Anger Over Immigration Could ‘Spread to the Streets’ if it is not Debated,” THE TELEGRAPH,
April 13, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/election-2010/7587249/Frank-Field-Anger-
over-immigration-could-spread-to-the-streets-if-it-is-not-debated.html; John Vinocur, For Eu-
rope, Few Hints of Tolerance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/
world/europe/02iht-politicus02.html; Dan Murphy, Norwegian Terrorist Stirs Multiculturalism
Opponents, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 25, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Back
channels/2011/0725/Norwegian-terrorist-stirs-multiculturalism-opponents; Cristina Costantini,
Anti-Latino Hate Crimes Rise As Immigration Debate Intensifies, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 18,
2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/17/anti-latino-hate-crimes-rise-immigration_n_
1015668.html.
74 See, e.g., NEWTON, supra note 21, at 85-103 (discussing the police narratives of deserv- R
ing versus undeserving immigrants), 106-112 (discussing how policy debates pit “freeloading”
immigrants versus taxpayers), 115-18 (discussing the “criminal alien narrative”).
75 According to a poll by Rasmussen Reports, 40% of the U.S. voters surveyed stated that
illegal immigrants are taking jobs away from U.S. citizens, and another 11% were unsure or
undecided.  Among Republican voters, 60% said that illegal immigrants are taking jobs away
from U.S. citizens. See http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/08/25/Poll-Half-say-immi
grants-not-taking-jobs/UPI-66431314329314/; see also Public Opinion Outreach Survey (find-
ing that 53% of liberals and progressives oppose providing health care to undocumented
aliens); American Council for Immigration Reform Survey (finding that 78% of Americans
believe that high immigration numbers have had a negative impact on the cost and quality of
the nation’s health care system).
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are then specifically applied to analyzing U.S. immigration policies in Part
IV.
B. The Basics of Categorization-Based Strategies for
Reducing Intergroup Bias
Since social categories are dynamic, changing the boundaries of the
categories can alter the way we think about other people as well as our own
spheres of membership.76  Most categorization-based strategies for reducing
intergroup bias involve reducing the salience of categories.77  Three such
strategies are decategorization, recategorization, and crossed categorization.
Decategorization focuses on eroding or erasing group boundaries until they
disappear, with the ultimate goal that people will interact with each other
primarily as individuals rather than as group members.  One way for decat-
egorization to occur is through personal interactions with outgroup members
that invalidate outgroup stereotypes.78  Decategorization can also occur
through recognition of  variability in the opinions of outgroup members or
by observing them respond as individuals rather than as a group.79
A second approach called recategorization, which was pioneered by Sa-
muel L. Gaertner and John F. Dovidio, proposes combining members of dif-
ferent groups into a single, more inclusive group, known as a
“superordinate” group.  The idea is to reduce intergroup bias “by changing
the nature of categorical representation from ‘us’ and ‘them’ to a more inclu-
sive ‘we.’” 80  For example, rendering salient a superordinate Jewish identity
among Israelis helps reduce their bias towards Russian immigrants by high-
lighting a common ingroup identity based on religion.81  Other studies have
shown the benefits of recategorization in a wide variety of situations, includ-
ing in multi-ethnic high schools, merged corporations, and blended fami-
lies.82  According to social psychologist Richard Crisp, “th[e] experimental
research has shown, beyond doubt, that the introduction of a superordinate
76 Gaertner, Dovidio & Houlette, supra note 17, at 530. R
77 See SAMUEL L. GAERTNER & JOHN F. DOVIDIO, REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS: THE COM-
MON INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL (2000).  Mutual ingroup differentiation is an approach that
involves the opposite tactic of increasing category salience in order to preserve feelings of
distinctiveness and avoid identity threat.  This approach is only effective in reducing inter-
group bias in situations where the different groups have equal status and engage in cooperative
activities.  Gaertner, Dovidio & Houlette, supra note 17, at 531-32, 536-38.  Since categories R
based on immigration status are hierarchical rather than equal and generally do not involve
cooperation, the mutual ingroup differentiation model is of limited relevance to this Article
and is not discussed below.
78 Gaertner, Dovidio & Houlette, supra note 17, at 530. R
79 Id.
80 Crisp, supra note 17, at 510. R
81 See Aharon Bizman & Yoel Yinon, Perceived Threat and Israeli Jews’ Evaluations of
Russian Immigrants: The Moderating Role of Jewish and Israeli Identity, 26 INT’L J. INTERCUL-
TURAL REL. 691-704 (2001).
82 Dovidio et al., supra note 53, at 5-6. R
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categorization can reduce bias,” although “whether, or for how long, it does
so” depends on the particular context.83
As Gaertner and Dovidio developed the concept of a common ingroup
identity, they realized that in certain situations, especially those involving
emotionally charged categories such as race, ethnicity and nationality, creat-
ing a “dual identity” may be more successful in reducing bias than a one
group identity.84  Examples of dual identities include “Mexican American”
and “Korean American,” which combine an inclusive, superordinate identity
(“American”) with another group identity (“Mexican” and “Korean”).85
Since racial or ethnic ties are often central, salient aspects of identity, people
may be unwilling or unable to relinquish them or to become “colorblind”
and ignore them as a basis for distinguishing different groups.86  A dual iden-
tity helps preserve a positive sense of distinctiveness and minimizes identity
threat, the feeling that one’s identity is at risk of being devalued, which can
undermine the success of recategorization based on a single identity.  Conse-
quently, embracing a dual identity can be more effective than embracing a
single identity for reducing bias,87 representing “the best all round solution
for reducing intergroup bias,” especially for people with strong group
identities.88
The third strategy for reducing intergroup bias is crossed categorization,
which proposes bringing out multiple, unrelated group identities as a way of
creating more complex portraits of people that avoid simple group-based
stereotypes.  This approach also works by highlighting group identities other
than the one giving rise to the conflict, thereby shifting attention to alterna-
tive, less provocative memberships.89  When we perceive people as “belong-
ing to multiple categories, rather than just one, intergroup differentiation
decreases, and with it goes intergroup bias.”90  For example, studies crossing
race and gender show that sharing some aspect of identity reduces bias as
well as stereotypes.  Thus, White women are likely to show less bias towards
Black women than towards Black men, because they have at least one sub-
group in common based on their gender.91  A crossed categorization model
differs from a dual identity model because the subgroups in crossed categori-
83 RICHARD J. CRISP & MILES HEWSTONE, MULTIPLE SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION:
PROCESSES, MODELS AND APPLICATIONS 7 (2006).
84 GAERTNER & DOVIDIO, supra note 77.  The concept of a dual identity resonates with R
Bill Ong Hing’s proposal for a path between (or beyond) assimilation and cultural pluralism.
Hing, supra note 15. R
85 See Dovidio et al., supra note 53, at 7. R
86 John F. Dovidio et al., Inclusion and Exclusion: Recategorization and the Perception of
Intergroup Boundaries, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION 251 (Do-
minic Abrams, et al., eds., 2005).
87 Dovidio et al., supra note 53, at 7. R
88 Crisp, supra note 17, at 514. R
89 DONELSON R. FORSYTH, GROUP DYNAMICS 436 (2010).
90 Id.
91 CRISP & HEWSTONE, supra note 83, at 57. R
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zation are unrelated (like race and gender), whereas in dual identity models,
they tend to be correlated or nested within each other.92
These three models should not be seen as mutually exclusive, since they
can “operate in a complementary fashion, perhaps sequentially, to reduce
intergroup bias in a more general and sustained way.”93  The specific context
determines which strategy or sequence of strategies will prove most effec-
tive.94  In the following section, this Article explores U.S. immigration poli-
cies’ impact on intergroup bias through the lenses of decategorization,
recategorization, and crossed categorization.
III. EXAMINING U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICIES THROUGH THE LENS OF
CATEGORIZATION-BASED STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING
INTERGROUP BIAS
While U.S. immigration policies have increased the salience of group
boundaries through militarization of the border, aggressive enforcement op-
erations, criminalization and other measures, categorization-based strategies
for reducing intergroup conflict stress weakening the salience of such bound-
aries as a way of decreasing intergroup bias.95  This section analyzes more
specifically how various immigration policies impede or promote the
processes of decategorization, recategorization, and crossed categorization.
A. Decategorization
As discussed above, a decategorization strategy predicts that eroding
the boundaries between groups will lead people to perceive each other as
individuals, rather than as group members, thereby reducing the influence of
both ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation.96  The basic principle is
that “me and you” replace “us and them,” leading to lower levels of group-
based bias.  One way decategorization occurs is by differentiating among
outgroup members.  A more complex perception of outgroup members per-
mits people to evaluate them based on their personal merit, rather than just
their categorical affiliations.97  This section first examines some of the ways
that U.S. immigration policies have reinforced collective anonymity among
immigrants, then discusses a recent change in policy towards prosecutorial
discretion that offers hope for more individualized treatment, laying the ini-
tial stepping stones for a path towards decategorization.
92 Crisp, supra note 17, at 515. R
93 Gaertner, Dovidio & Houlette, supra note 17, at 539. R
94 Id.
95 GAERTNER & DOVIDIO, supra note 77. R
96 Gaertner, Dovidio & Houlette, supra note 17, at 530–31. R
97 Nurcan Ensari & Norman Miller, Decategorization and the Reduction of Bias In the
Crossed Categorization Paradigm, 31 EUR. J. SOC. PSY. 192, 195 (2001).
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1. Immigration Policies that Reinforce Collective Anonymity
U.S. immigration policies actively prevent decategorization by deper-
sonalizing immigrants.  In this respect, today’s immigrants resemble colo-
nized subjects of times past who bore “the mark of the plural.”98  As Albert
Memmi explained, “[t]he colonized is never characterized in an individual
manner; he is entitled only to drown in an anonymous collectivity.”99  Con-
gress has ensured that most immigrants receive collective rather than indi-
vidual treatment in a number of ways.  First, Congress has consistently
expanded the broad categories of people subject to exclusion and removal
from the United States.  Second, Congress has sharply restricted the forms of
discretionary relief available on an individualized basis during removal pro-
ceedings.  Third, Congress has curtailed the scope of judicial review to pre-
vent the federal courts of appeal from reviewing discretionary
determinations that involve examining individual equities.
Before turning to each of these trends, one should note that the initial
tension between decategorization and immigration policy stems from the
plenary power doctrine, which permits Congress to create group-based clas-
sifications in the regulation of immigration that would be impermissible in
other contexts.100  Thus, classifications based on national origin, which
would ordinarily receive strict scrutiny, receive only rational basis review in
the context of regulating immigration.101  The logic of equal protection cases
stressing that “the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as sim-
ply components of a  . . . class”102 therefore does not apply to the immigra-
tion realm.  The plenary power doctrine has played a central role not only in
excluding entire national groups, such as the Chinese from 1878 to 1943, but
98 ALBERT MEMMI, RACISM 211 (2000).
99 Id.
100 See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its broad
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (“Over
no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the
admission of aliens.”); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (describing the power to expel
aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute largely immune from judicial control).
101 See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24
(1982) (rejecting the claim that undocumented aliens are a “suspect class” and applying ra-
tional basis review); Midi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 132, 137 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Although courts
usually subject national-origin classifications to strict scrutiny, when such classifications in-
volve unadmitted aliens in the immigration context, we subject them only to rational basis
review.”); Masnauskas v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1067, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying rational
basis review to a challenged immigration classification based on national origin).
102 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 722–23
(2007) (holding that admission plans designed to achieve racial integration among students in
Seattle and Jefferson County public schools were unconstitutional because they “rel[ied] on
racial classifications in a ‘nonindivdiualized, mechanical’ way.”).  Chief Justice Roberts, writ-
ing for the majority, distinguished the Court’s decision in Grutter, which upheld the admis-
sions policy of the University of Michigan Law School, by stressing, “the admissions program
at issue there focused on each applicant as an individual, and not simply as a member of a
particular racial group.” Id. at 748.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLA\15\HLA105.txt unknown Seq: 18 27-JUN-12 11:03
146 Harvard Latino Law Review [Vol. 15
also in “further[ing] white dominance by providing a docile Mexican
workforce at the bottom of the economic ladder.”103
In recent decades, Congress has promoted categorical exclusion and re-
moval from the United States through a series of legislative reforms that
substantially expanded the criminal grounds of removal, created new
grounds of inadmissibility, and introduced a system of expedited removal
that does not provide for any individual hearing before an immigration
judge.104  In particular, Congress drastically expanded the INA’s definition of
an “aggravated felony,” which eliminates eligibility for most forms of indi-
vidualized relief from removal, and created sweeping definitions of “terror-
ist activities” and “terrorist organizations” that provided new bases for
inadmissibility and removal.105
At the same time, Congress has systematically constricted the forms of
discretionary relief available to individuals facing removal.  Congress origi-
nally created such discretionary forms of relief in deportation cases during
the 1940s as a response to calls for reform by legal realists who rejected “the
administration of law based on rigid categories without room for discretion
or experience.”106  At that time, the demands for reform focused primarily on
the unjust impact of deportation on European and Canadian immigrants,
leading to the creation of forms of relief with broad criteria that included a
“general loophole” for “exceptionally meritorious cases.”107  During the
past two decades, however, Congress has whittled away the relief available
to individuals facing removal, eliminating any general loophole for
discretion.
In 1990, Congress eliminated the Judicial Recommendation Against
Deportation (JRAD), which had existed since 1917 and served as the pri-
mary mechanism for state and federal criminal court judges to prevent de-
portation due to a conviction on an individualized basis.108  In 1996,
Congress eliminated the 212(c) waiver, which allowed immigration judges
to provide discretionary relief to permanent residents facing deportation
103 Angela Harris, Equality Troubles: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1950 (2000).
104 See The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 1751(b), 102 Stat. 4181
(1988); The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, sec. 440, §1101(a)(43), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277-78; The Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 321,
§1101(a)(43), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-627 to -628.
105 See “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act” (USA PATRIOT Act, H.R. 3162, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272); REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005).
106 MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA 78 (2005).
107 Id. at 76, 82, 86.
108 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 890 (giving judges in both state and
federal criminal cases the power to recommend than an alien convicted of a crime “shall not
be deported”); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, §505, 104 Stat. 5050 (repealing the
JRAD formerly codified at INA § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)).
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based on criminal convictions.109  That same year, Congress also eliminated
suspension of deportation, a form of discretionary relief that allowed an
alien to remain in the U.S. by showing extreme hardship to herself or to a
U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, parent or child.110  Congress re-
placed these forms of relief with two new, more restrictive forms of relief
known as cancellation of removal for permanent residents and cancellation
of removal for non-permanent residents.111  The former precludes all perma-
nent residents convicted of an aggravated felony, while the latter imposes
the incredibly high bar of showing “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, parent or child, in
addition to other requirements.112  Unlike suspension of deportation, cancel-
lation of removal does not permit the judge to consider hardship to the immi-
grant herself;113 this, in itself, undermines her personhood.
As the Supreme Court noted with concern in Padilla, these reforms
have made deportation “virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens
convicted of crimes.”114  Even for those without any convictions, there are
very limited forms of relief available.  During the past three years, only 25%
of removal cases nationwide involved some type of application for relief,
and immigration judges granted relief in just 12-13% of cases, issuing orders
of removal about 75-80% of the time.115  For those who are not fleeing perse-
cution and who are not eligible to adjust their status through a close family
member, the prospect of obtaining discretionary relief remains particularly
dismal.  Out of over 280,000 removal cases completed by the immigration
courts in 2010, fewer than 10,000 immigrants total received some form of
cancellation of removal.116
In addition to directly curtailing available forms of discretionary relief,
Congress has indirectly limited the ability to apply for relief by requiring
109 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)
§ 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-597, repealed discretionary relief under § 212(c) and replaced it with
a new form of cancellation of removal that is much more restrictive, precluding anyone con-
victed of an aggravated felony. See id. at 3009-594 (creating 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)).  In INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), the Court held that the repeal of § 212(c) did not apply retroac-
tively to aliens who had pled guilty prior to the statute’s enactment.
110 IIRIRA repealed suspension of removal under former 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1).
111 Cancellation of removal for permanent residents is codified at INA § 240A(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(a), while cancellation of removal for non-permanent residents is codified at
INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
112 See INA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (precluding those with an aggravated
felony from cancellation of removal for permanent residents); INA § 240A(b)(D), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(D) (requiring “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse,
parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence).
113 See INA § 240A(b)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(D).
114 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
115 Executive Office of Immigration Review, FY 2010 Statistical Year Book N1, D2 (Jan-
uary 2011).  In 2010, 71,924 removal cases involved an application for relief and 215,283
cases did not.  Immigration judges granted relief in 30,838 of these cases and ordered removal
in 166,424 cases.
116 Id. at R3. Only 3,716 permanent residents and 4,487 non-permanent residents received
cancellation of removal in 2010.
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mandatory detention of certain aliens, which creates serious obstacles to ob-
taining both legal counsel and the evidence necessary to support an applica-
tion.  Consequently, the rate of applications is much lower than the national
average in places where immigrants are detained.  For example, the applica-
tions rates at the Stewart Detention Facility in Georgia, the Oakdale Federal
Detention Center in Louisiana, and the Houston Service Processing Center
in Texas range from just 1-5% of cases, compared to application rates of 57-
65% at immigration courts for non-detained individuals in Los Angeles, Or-
lando, and New York City, where lawyers are readily available.117
By limiting the available forms of discretionary relief as well as the
practical ability to apply for them, Congress fortified the boundaries of sta-
tus-based categories.  Congress went even further, however, taking steps to
curtail judicial review over removal cases and thereby ensure, as much as
possible, that federal judges would not have an opportunity to engage in
individualized analysis.118  Specifically, Congress precluded judicial review
of factual issues in discretionary decisions other than asylum, thereby
preventing the circuit courts from considering the individual equities of a
case.119  In addition, Congress precluded judicial review of orders of removal
against criminal aliens convicted of certain crimes, except for constitutional
questions and issues of law.120  The limitations on judicial review allow only
abstract, disembodied questions of law to percolate to the federal courts,
once again rendering invisible the individuals involved.  Through these vari-
ous reforms, Congress has demonstrated its determination to deport broad
categories of depersonalized people.121
Similarly, the executive branch has historically pursued programs that
perpetuate the depersonalization of immigrants.  When the Roosevelt admin-
istration initiated the bracero program, which brought in about one million
Mexican agricultural workers to the U.S. between 1942 and 1964,122 Mexico
had to insist on Individual Work Contracts between the U.S. Government
and each individual Mexican worker out of concern that “Americans would
not respect each bracero as an individual person.”123 This fear was not un-
reasonable, given that some growers “wanted to merely contract large num-
117 Id. at N2.
118 Lenni Benson, The New World of Judicial Review of Removal Orders, 12 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 233 (1998).
119 INA § 242(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(B)(ii).
120 INA § 242(C)-(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(C)-(D).
121 See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1959 (2000) (arguing that
under the immigration laws passed by Congress in 1996, “the sanction of deportation is regu-
larly and automatically meted out on the presumption that the label of a crime is all we need to
know about a person before entering an order of banishment”).
122 NGAI supra note 106, at 139.  As Ngai explains, the decision to create the bracero R
program was momentous because the United States had outlawed foreign contract labor since
1885, regarding it as akin to slavery. Id at 137; Kevin R. Johnson, Race, The Immigration
Laws, and Domestic Race Relations:  A “Magic Mirror” Into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND.
L.J. 1111, 1136 (1998); see also KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PRO-
GRAM, IMMIGRATION AND THE I.N.S. (1992).
123 NGAI supra note 106, at 140. R
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bers of braceros without taking their names.”124  Even with individual
contracts, the system remained strikingly impersonal, as the INS processed
“from several hundred to several thousand incoming braceros a day,” an
operation that “assumed the character of ‘batch processing.’” 125 Braceros
could not bargain over wages or working conditions and did not have the
right to choose their own employers, leading to widespread exploitation.126
Organized labor compared the bracero program to “imported colonial-
ism,”127 while liberals likened braceros to “‘legal slave[s]’ . . . ‘kept as if in
[a] concentration camp,’” metaphors that point to a profound level of
dehumanization.128
The executive branch’s enforcement policies have also treated immi-
grants as indistinguishable masses rather than individuals.  For example,
when undocumented agricultural workers continued to stream into the U.S.
despite the existence of the bracero program (in part because Mexico re-
fused to allow braceros into states like Texas that subjected Mexicans to Jim
Crow segregation laws), the INS responded with a mass deportation cam-
paign called “Operation Wetback” in 1954.129  This campaign, like the
bracero program itself, demonstrated how deeply depersonalized Mexican
migrants had become, as the INS swept them up by the hundreds of
thousands and “‘dumped’” them on the other side of the border, carting
them in “‘like cows’” on trucks and shipping them off on vessels resem-
bling “‘eighteenth century slave ship[s].’” 130
While contemporary enforcement campaigns may elicit less colorful
descriptions, they still involve mass roundups.  Worksite raids, for example,
which became popular in 2008 under the Bush administration, allowed ICE
to arrest hundreds of workers at a time without exercising any discretion,
often based on nothing more than “Hispanic appearance.”131  In some cases,
such as the raid of the Agriprocessors plant in Postville, Iowa, which led to
the arrest of 389 mostly Latino individuals, the depersonalization of immi-
124 Id.
125 Id. at 141.
126 Id. at 137-38, 143 (discussing how bracero workers filed several thousand complaints
per year regarding underpayment and poor working conditions); see also Kevin R. Johnson,
“Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons,
28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 274 (1997) (noting that even after the dismantling of the
bracero program, “the U.S. Border Patrol informally collaborated with growers in the South-
west to ensure ready availability of cheap undocumented labor,” then came “full circle” with
Operation Wetback in 1954).
127 NGAI, supra note 106, at 166. R
128 Id. at 161.
129 Id. at 155.
130 Id. at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted).
131 Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1104 (2004).  For example, on August 25, 2008, ICE arrested 600
workers at a transformer plant in Laurel, Mississippi; on October 7, 2008, ICE arrested 300
workers at a chicken processing plant in Greensville, South Carolina; and on May 12, 2008,
ICE arrested 389 people at the Agriprocessors plant in Postville, Iowa. See Amalia Greenberg
& Shanti Martin, How ICE Threatens the Ethical Responsibilities of Key Players in Worksite
Raids: Postville Study 16, available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol16/
iss1/4/.
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grants during the raid bled into the criminal proceedings that followed based
on charges including the use of a false work authorization document and
false Social Security number.  In “script[ing] the criminal proceedings
through mass-prepared plea agreements” and engaging in “expedited, bulk
prosecutions,” the government trampled on individual rights, including the
right to due process and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.132  Similarly,
“[a]long the Texas border, enforcement policy has shifted and mass plea
agreements with no meaningful process are becoming the norm despite the
attachment of Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees.”133  ICE also engages
in “legally questionable mass arrests in neighborhoods . . . under the pretext
of serving warrants on criminal aliens.”134
Needless to say, these types of enforcement campaigns have utterly
failed to stop the flow of undocumented immigrants, who work in numerous
low-wage industries, often in a depersonalized manner.  Legal scholars have
described them variously as “invisible workers” and “ghost workers,”135
echoing the Supreme Court’s concern in Plyler about a “shadow population”
that “raises the specter of a permanent caste.”136 As Mae Ngai notes, an
“illegal alien,” like a specter, is “a body stripped of individual person-
age.”137  In other words, undocumented immigrants occupy a disembodied
presence by providing desired labor while remaining undesirable as work-
132 Greenberg & Martin, supra note 131, at 17-18. R
133 Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L. J. 458, n. 243 (2009).
134 Bill Ong Hing, Reason Over Hysteria – Keynote Essay, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 275,
293 (2011).
135 See generally Lenni B. Benson, The Invisible Worker, 27 N.C. J. INT’L & COM. REG.
483 (2002); Ruben Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the
Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 737, 738
(2003) (describing the decision in Hoffman Plastics as “a crushing blow to the millions of
‘ghost workers’ who toil in the shadows of our economy—always present and yet denied exis-
tence by law and courts”); Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People,
70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965 (1995); Rene Galindo, Embodying the Gap Between National Inclusion
and Exclusion: The ‘Testimonios’ of Three Undocumented Students at a 2007 Congressional
Hearing, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 377, 378 (2011) (stating that self-identifying as undocu-
mented not only “interrupts the ‘regime of enforced invisibility’ . . . [but also] challenges their
metaphoric and political confinement to the ‘shadows of society’ where undocumented immi-
grants are expected to live anonymous and depersonalized lives as laborers without names,
faces, or voices”).
136 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1982).
137 NGAI, supra note 106, at 61; see also Johnson, supra note 126, at 267-70 (discussing R
how the term “alien” depersonalizes undocumented immigrants by casting them as nonper-
sons and not merely noncitizens).
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ers;138 their relegation to the sphere of work and exclusion from the realm of
rights undermines common conceptions of personhood.139
The intense depersonalization of immigrants, especially undocumented
immigrants, cultivates and compounds bias, undermining social cohesion:
“[s]ocial interaction that is grounded in depersonalized perceptions may re-
sult in prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict.”140  Moreover, the
values of liberty, equality and democracy derive not from the concept of
citizenship, but from the concept of personhood.141  Denying the personhood
of undocumented immigrants therefore provides a foundation for severing
fundamental rights.
2. From Mass Deportation to Prosecutorial Discretion: Entering a
New Era of Individualized Enforcement?
Recent policy changes by the Obama administration instructing ICE to
exercise greater prosecutorial discretion represents a positive step forward
towards the individualization of undocumented immigrants and can help
promote decategorization.  On June 30, 2010, the Director of ICE, John Mor-
ton, issued a memorandum setting forth the priorities for the apprehension,
detention and removal of aliens.142  The memo noted that ICE has resources
to remove only about 400,000 people per year, less than four percent of the
estimated undocumented population.143  Accordingly, the memo instructed
ICE employees that the highest priority would be the removal of aliens who
pose a danger to national security or a threat to public safety.144  The next
highest priorities would be “recent illegal entrants”145 and “[a]liens who are
fugitives or otherwise obstruct immigration controls”146 – priorities that
aimed to maintain the “integrity” of border enforcement efforts and the
138 Michael Kearney, Borders and Boundaries of State at the End of Empire, 4 J. OF HIST.
SOCIOLOGY, 52, 53-70 (1991).  The Plyler court recognized this dichotomy in stating that un-
documented aliens are “encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but
nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful re-
sidents.”  Plyler v. Doe, 457 US 202, 218-19 (1982).  The Court’s opinion suggests that educa-
tion can help restore personhood by allowing undocumented children to become “self-reliant
and self-sufficient participants in society” through “individual achievement.” Id.
139 Kearney, supra note 138.
140 GAERTNER & DOVIDIO, supra note 77. R
141 See Markus Dubber, Citizenship and Penal Law, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 190, 195
(2008).
142 Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Exer-
cising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities
of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 29, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.immilaw.com/FAQ/ICE%20prosecution%20priorities%202010.pdf.
143 Id. at 1.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 2. The memo explained that “recent illegal entrants” include those who “recently
violated immigration controls at the border, at ports of entry, or through the knowing abuse of
the visa and visa waiver programs.” Id.
146 Id. at 2. The memo explained that this group includes “aliens who are subject to a final
order of removal and abscond, fail to depart, or intentionally obstruct immigration controls.”
Id.
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immigration adjudication processes.147  While the memo provided that
“[r]esources should be committed primarily to advancing [these] priori-
ties,”148 it also stated that “[n]othing in this memorandum should be con-
strued to prohibit or discourage the apprehension, detention or removal of
other aliens unlawfully in the United States.”149
In December 2010, Congress failed to pass the DREAM Act, which
would have created a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants who
entered the U.S. as children, graduated from high school, and completed two
years of college or served two years in the military.  Perhaps in response to
public anger over the DREAM Act’s failure and the ongoing deportations of
non-criminals, the Obama administration took steps to support implementa-
tion of ICE’s priorities.  On March 2, 2011, ICE reissued its June 30, 2010
memorandum, a testament to the inefficacy of the first memo in changing
operations on the ground.
Shortly thereafter, on June 17, 2011, ICE’s Director issued two new
memoranda on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  One memorandum
generally addressed the exercise of prosecutorial discretion consistent with
civil immigration priorities,150 while the other focused specifically on
prosecutorial discretion in cases involving the victims of crimes, witnesses
and plaintiffs.151  The more general memo explained that “prosecutorial dis-
cretion is the authority of an agency . . . to decide to what degree to enforce
the law against a particular individual” and provided a list of factors to con-
sider.152  These factors include, but are not limited to, the individual’s length
of residence in the U.S., circumstances of arrival, pursuit of education in the
U.S., criminal history, immigration history, contributions to the community,
family relationships, the likelihood of being granted temporary or permanent
status, and cooperation with law enforcement.153  The memo explained that
ICE should evaluate the “totality of the circumstances” on a case-by-case
basis, with no single factor being determinative.154  The other memo, specifi-
cally addressing victims, witnesses, and plaintiffs, used much stronger lan-
147 Id.
148 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
149 Id. at 3.
150 Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Exer-
cising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities
of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), avail-
able at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.
pdf).
151 Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mem-
orandum on Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17,
2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf.
152 Morton, supra note 150, at 2, 4.
153 Id. at 4.
154 Id. In addition, the memo identifies “certain classes of individuals that warrant particu-
lar care,” such as veterans and members of the U.S. armed forces, long-time lawful permanent
residents, minors and the elderly, individuals present in the U.S. since childhood, pregnant or
nursing women, victims of certain crimes, and individuals with disabilities or serious health
conditions. Id. at 5.
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guage, stating that favorable exercise of discretion in these situations is
usually appropriate absent “serious adverse factors.”155
These memos, like their predecessors, did not result in any immediate,
visible change in ICE’s operations on the ground.156  The tide began to turn,
however, on August 18, 2011, when the Obama administration publicly an-
nounced that it would review 300,000 cases currently pending in immigra-
tion courts and dismiss those that do not involve criminal convictions.157  In
particular, the administration indicated that it would stop the removal of
long-time residents with no criminal history who entered the U.S. as chil-
dren, who have family members in the military, or who have U.S. citizen
children or spouses.158  We have yet to see how this new policy will play out
after years of disconnect between the policies that ICE articulates at the
highest levels and its local operations.  Within a week of President Obama’s
announcement, however, ICE began to dismiss removal cases against certain
individuals with no criminal record.159  It is still unclear whether ICE will
also exercise discretion in cases of individuals with minor or very old con-
victions and strong equities.
The new policy of prosecutorial discretion recognizes that membership
in U.S. society is a matter of degree, rather than an in/out dichotomy.  It also
departs from other enforcement measures by blurring rather than brightening
the line between “legal” and “illegal” status insofar as it suggests that cer-
tain undocumented individuals should be allowed to remain here.  While the
exercise of discretion does not confer any legal status to these individuals, it
helps deflate the concept of “illegal” personhood by distinguishing civil im-
migration violations from criminal conduct.  Moreover, by requiring ICE to
engage in case-by-case evaluations of people currently in removal proceed-
ings, the new policy demands personalization of the process through consid-
eration of individual equities.  In other words, the new policy should help
prevent undocumented immigrants who do not qualify for one of the limited
forms of relief from drowning in the collective anonymity of summary
removal.
Studies suggest that decategorization often works well as an initial ap-
proach in situations of overt hostility among groups.160 Given simmering
anti-immigrant sentiments, a policy urging prosecutorial discretion repre-
sents a good starting point for shifting attitudes towards undocumented im-
migrants.  By emphasizing individual variation within that outgroup and
highlighting the ways in which many members of the outgroup actually re-
155 Morton, supra note 151, at 2.
156 See Vazquez, supra note 39, at 661-64 (discussing how ICE primarily targets individu- R
als with no criminal history).
157 Julia Preston, U.S. Issues New Deportation Policy’s First Reprieves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
22, 2011.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 E.g., John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Intergroup Bias, in HANDBOOK OF SO-
CIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1102 (Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert & Gardner Lindzey, eds., 2010); T.
F. Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory, 49 ANN. REV. OF PSY. 65-85 (1998).
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semble members of the ingroup (e.g., by drawing attention to undocumented
immigrants who entered the U.S. as children and have life experiences that
parallel those of people born in the U.S.), it can initiate the process of
decategorization.
Of course, while the new policy blurs some boundaries, it also high-
lights others, such as the boundary between the categories of “criminals”
and “non-criminals.”  Indeed, one might argue that the new policy deploys
criminality, rather than legal status, as the primary concept for marking the
boundaries of social belonging.  In this respect, the policy reflects a “con-
tractarian notion of legal personhood . . . predicated on the view that only
those who abide by the law can be considered citizens.”161  Such treatment
of criminals as social outcasts not only conflicts with research on the nor-
malcy of crime,162 but also ignores the tenuous line between criminal and
non-criminal conduct.163
In the immigration context, this line is particularly hazy, as the majority
of federal prosecutions today are for immigration violations, primarily
against Mexicans and Central Americans who have no prior criminal re-
cord.164  The government has also creatively employed criminal laws such as
the federal identity theft statute, which carries a two-year minimum sen-
tence, to prosecute undocumented immigrants who use Social Security num-
bers or green cards that belong to other people.165  Moreover, programs
involving cooperation between ICE and local law enforcement have resulted
largely in the prosecution of “those who have the misfortune of ‘driving
while brown,’” leading to high rates of convictions for offenses like driving
161 Lucia Zedner, Security, the State, and the Citizen: The Changing Architecture of Crime
Control, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 379, 390 (2010).  Zedner points out that this concept derives
from Rousseau, who reasons: “since every wrongdoer attacks the society’s law, he becomes by
his deed a rebel and a traitor to the country; by violating its law, he ceases to be a member of
it.” JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 79 (M. Cranston trans., Penguin Books
1968).
162 Lawrence E. Cohen, The Normalcy of Crime: From Durkheim to Evolutionary Ecol-
ogy, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 113
(Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams, III eds., 1997) (arguing that “most crime is best
understood as normal behavior” and extending Durkheim’s insights by applying an evolution-
ary ecological framework).
163 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 423 (4th ed. 2006)
(describing the difficulty in “drawing a line between noncriminal preparation and criminal
attempt”); Paul H., Robinson, Owen D. Jones & Robert Kurzban, Realism, Punishment and
Reform, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1611, 1619 (2010) (discussing studies showing that “people can
agree on the relative blameworthiness of different offense cases yet disagree as to where on the
continuum of blameworthiness the line should be drawn marking off the minimum point for
criminal liability and punishment”).
164 See New Data on Federal Court Prosecutions Reveal Non-Violent Immigration Prose-
cutions Up, Immigr. Pol’y Center, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/new-data-
federal-court-prosecutions-reveal-non-violent-immigration-prosecutions; see also Yolanda
Vazquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the Incor-
poration of Immigration Law Into the Criminal Justice System, 54 HOW. L. J. 639, 663 (2010).
165 See The Supreme Court 2008 Term Leading Cases, Mens Rea Requirement, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 312, 312-13 (2009).  In Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009), the
Supreme Court limited the range of conduct within the statute’s reach by requiring defendants
to have known that the identity belonged to another person.
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without insurance and driving without a license.166  In fact, traffic offenses
and immigration violations currently represent the second and third largest
criminal categories for removal, after drug offenses.167  Thus, the failure to
apply prosecutorial discretion to people with criminal records would still
result in the removal of a large number of non-violent criminals who pose no
threat to public safety and whose convictions remain closely connected to
their lack of legal status.168
Overall, the new policy on prosecutorial discretion promises to erode
boundaries based on legal status, but its focus on criminality urges caution.
Depending on how ICE interprets and applies the new policy, it may indeed
introduce a level of individualized analysis to immigration proceedings that
will prevent lumping people into an elusive category called “illegal aliens.”
On the other hand, it may also lead to grouping those with any kind of
conviction into a category called “criminals,” ignoring how undocumented
immigrants are uniquely vulnerable to certain kinds of criminal charges,
based on both their lack of legal status and their ethnicity or race.169  If the
latter occurs, the policy may succeed in reducing bias towards one group
while simultaneously increasing bias towards another, overlapping group.
Increased prosecutorial discretion represents one step towards decat-
egorization.  Other reforms that would help promote decategorization in-
clude: reigning in the criminal grounds for inadmissibility and removal,
especially the sweeping definition of “aggravated felony”; expanding the
scope of discretionary relief available to people in removal proceeding; lim-
iting or eliminating mandatory detention, which seriously interferes with the
ability to apply for relief, and restoring judicial review.
B. Recategorization
Unlike decategorization, which attempts to reduce intergroup bias by
eroding existing group boundaries and thereby promoting interactions as in-
dividuals rather than as group members, recategorization involves combin-
ing members of different groups into a single, more inclusive group and
thereby creating a common ingroup identity.170  Once we perceive outgroup
166 Vazquez, supra note 39, at 662.  In North Carolina, for example, 56% of the 3,000 R
noncitizens placed in removal proceedings in 2008 as a result of 287(g) agreements were
charged with violations of motor vehicle laws. Id.
167 Id. at 665.
168 Id. Vazquez notes that none of the crimes that “might truly be considered violent or
dangerous, such as terrorism, murder or sexual assault . . . appear to be a leading or even
considerable cause of removal.” Id.
169 Racial profiling has been one of the most controversial aspects of cooperation between
immigration and law enforcement authorities.  In one Alabama study, for example, Latinos
were just 2% of the population but comprised 58% of the drivers stopped by police offers
pursuant to 287(g) agreements.  Vazquez, supra note 39, at 662-63. R
170 Adam R. Pearson, John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, The Nature of Contempo-
rary Prejudice: Insights from Aversive Racism, 3 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS
314 (2009) (showing that the salience of a common ingroup identity can inhibit activation of
explicit bias); J.J. Van Bavel and W. A. Cunningham, Self-Categorization with a Novel Mixed-
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members as ingroup members, they receive the benefits of ingroup status,
including positive thoughts, feelings and behaviors.171 Creating a common
“superordinate” group identity therefore helps redirect the cognitive
processes that previously led to favoritism of ingroup members toward for-
mer outgroup members.
The recategorization strategy suggests that creating a common “Ameri-
can” identity should help reduce intergroup bias.172  In the case of European
immigrants to the U.S., such recategorization actually occurred.  While
southern and eastern Europeans, as well as Catholics and Jews, faced intense
discrimination at various points in U.S. history, a legal process that ulti-
mately categorized them all as racially “White” helped them forge a com-
mon “American” identity.173  Unfortunately, the construction of this new
ingroup was based, in large part, on the exclusion of nonwhite outgroups.
At different and overlapping intervals, African Americans,174 Native Ameri-
cans,175 and Asians176 all faced bars to U.S. citizenship.  As Ian Haney-Lope´z
and others have aptly demonstrated, during the late nineteenth century and
the first part of the twentieth century, courts defined American identity
largely by delineating the boundaries of Whiteness.177  Even when the gov-
ernment uniformly granted Native Americans citizenship in 1924, the spe-
cial naturalization oaths that they had to take required them to embrace new
identities as White men and women.178
Race Group Moderates Automatic Social and Racial Biases, 35 PERSONALITY AND SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 321-35 (2009) (showing that a common ingroup identity can inhibit acti-
vation of implicit bias).
171 Dovidio et al., supra note 86, at 250. R
172 Jean S. Phinney & Linda L. Alipuria, Multiple Social Categorization and Identity
Among Multiracial, Multiethnic, and Multicultural Individuals: Processes and Implications, in
MULTIPLE SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION: PROCESSES, MODELS AND APPLICATIONS 232 (Richard J.
Crisp & Miles Hewstone, eds., 2006) (“An American identity has the potential of being a
superordinate category that can serve to reduce ethnic and racial tensions among diverse ethnic
and racial categories.”).
173 IAN F. HANEY LO´PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 74 (2006);
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1709, 1742-43 (1993) (explaining
that an “amalgamation of various European strains into an American identity was facilitated
by an oppositional definition of Black as ‘other”’).
174 The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution granted citizenship to former Afri-
can slaves in 1868.
175 Congress granted full citizenship to all Native Americans in 1924.  Indian Citizenship
Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924), current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)
(2000)).
176 See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed by Act
of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600); Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (re-
pealed 1952) (excluding Asian Indians and all other inhabitants of a “barred Asiatic zone”
extending from Afghanistan to the Pacific, with the exception of Japan); Page Act of 1875, ch.
141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974) (barring Mongolian prostitutes); United States v. Thind, 261
U.S. 204 (1923) (upholding exclusion of Asians from naturalization).
177 See generally LO´PEZ, supra note 173; NGAI, supra note 106. R
178 Department of the Interior, Ritual on Admission of Indians to Full American Citizen-
ship 1924  (“You have shot your last arrow.  That means that you are no longer to live the life
of an Indian.  You are from this day forward to live the life of the white man.”) (on file with
author). Thanks to Professor Gloria Valencia-Weber for providing a copy of this oath.
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While Latinos never faced categorical exclusion from U.S. citizenship
and were never defined as nonwhite by the courts,179 they (in particular Mex-
icans) became “othered” through their construction as prototypical “illegal
aliens” and through their historical treatment as nonwhites.180  During segre-
gation, states such as Texas and Arkansas categorized Mexicans as
“colored” and barred them from “Whites only” areas, which is why Mexico
refused to send bracero workers to those states.181  The disjunction between
Latino and American identity also became apparent through the U.S. gov-
ernment’s repeated failure to distinguish between Mexican Americans (i.e.
U.S. citizens of Mexican descent) and undocumented immigrants during
mass deportation campaigns, such as the deportation of hundreds of
thousands of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the 1930s and during
Operation Wetback in 1954, much like the government failed to distinguish
between Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans during World War II.
Overt discrimination ended with the Immigration Act of 1965, which
repealed the national quota system and opened the door to U.S. citizenship
to immigrants from all countries, but by that time the association between
American identity and Whiteness was deeply entrenched.  This association,
which persists until today, presents a serious obstacle to reducing bias
through a recategorization strategy that is based on bringing immigrants into
the fold of American identity.  Another serious challenge involves increased
bias against those groups who remain excluded from a superordinate Ameri-
can identity even after recategorization, a problem that has plagued past le-
galization programs.  Each of these challenges is discussed in greater detail
below.
1. The Challenge of Creating An Inclusive “American” Identity
Recent studies in implicit social cognition “reveal a very consistent and
robust” association between American identity and Whiteness, which
Thierry Devos and Mahzarin R. Banaji have called the “American = White
effect.”182 In a series of experiments that investigated “the degree to which
the quality of ‘American’ is given to Americans of varying ethnic origin,”
Devos and Banaji found that White Americans, Asian Americans and Afri-
can Americans who outwardly endorse egalitarian beliefs and value a non-
179 To this day, the U.S. census does not include “Latino” as a racial group, indicating
instead that Latinos can be of any race.
180 NEWTON, supra note 21, at 137-62. R
181 NGAI, supra note 106, at 147. R
182 Theirry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, American=White?, 88 J. OF PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSY. 447, 453 (2005) (emphasis added); see also Thierry Devos & Leakhena Heng,
Whites Are Granted the American Identity More Swiftly than Asians: Disentangling the Role of
Automatic and Controlled Processes, 40 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 199 (2009) (confirming the
American=White effect utilizing a sequential priming technique to minimize the influence of
deliberate cognitive processes).
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exclusory definition of American identity still associate being “American”
with being “White.”183
While participants explicitly purported to view African Americans as
equally “American” as White Americans, measures of implicit bias indi-
cated that they perceived African Americans as less American than
Whites.184  With respect to Asian Americans, the results were even more
striking, as participants both implicitly and explicitly perceived Asian Amer-
icans known to be U.S. citizens by birth as “less American than both Whites
and African Americans.”185  Devos and Banaji’s results revealed that Asian
Americans not only remain perpetual foreigners in the eyes of Whites, but
also in the eyes of other Asian Americans and African Americans, as all
three groups associate “White” and “American” more easily than “Asian”
and “American.”186
This study and others have found that the American = White effect
holds up even when comparing celebrities known to be foreign and White
(e.g. Gerard Depardieu or Kate Winslet) with celebrities known to be Ameri-
can and Asian (e.g. Connie Chung or Lucy Liu).187  Although the partici-
pants consciously knew that the White celebrities were foreign, they still
implicitly associated the White celebrities more strongly with the concept of
American.  Thus, the study demonstrated beyond doubt that “Asian Ameri-
cans remain perpetual foreigners in the eyes of American society despite
their American nationality.”188  This same phenomenon has been demon-
strated with respect to African Americans through experiments showing that
participants more easily associate Hillary Clinton with being “American”
than President Barack Obama.189  In fact, participants even associated former
183 Devos & Banaji, supra note 182. R
184 Even in athletics, an area where the researchers hypothesized that African Americans
would represent better exemplars of the category “Americans,” this proved true only for ex-
plicit attitudes, but implicitly participants still associated White athletes more than Black ath-
letes with the concept of “American.” Id.
185 Id.
186 Social dominance theory may help explain why Asian Americans would view them-
selves as less American than Whites, as it posits that all groups, even disadvantaged ones, tend
to legitimize existing social hierarchies, even at the expense of their own group’s interests.
Devos & Banaji, supra note 182; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 R
CAL. L. REV. 751, 759-60 (1991) (“The notion that the world is just, and that existing inequali-
ties are deserved or desired, plays a large role in forming preferences and beliefs.”).
187 Devos & Banaji, supra note 182, at 456; see also Thierry Devos & Debbie S. Ma, Is R
Kate Winslet More American Than Lucy Liu?  The Impact of Construal Processes on the Im-
plicit Ascription of a National Identity, 47 BRIT. J. SOCIAL PSY. 191, 206 (2008) (finding that
even a celebrity who is a White foreigner, such as Kate Winslet, is perceived as more Ameri-
can than an Asian American celebrity, such as Lucy Liu).
188 Nilanjana Dasgupta, Color Lines in the Mind: Implicit Prejudice, Discrimination, and
the Potential for Change, in TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COLOR LINES: MULTIRACIAL CHANGE IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 103 (Andrew Grant-Thomas & Gary Orfield eds., 2009); see also
Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The “Reticent” Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 33-38 (discussing how Asian-American citizens are treated as “foreigners”).
189 Kyle Jones, Dara McIntyre, Travis Gaffud, Debbie S. Ma, & Thierry Devos, Is Barack
Obama less American than Hillary Clinton?, Poster presented at the 88th Annual Convention
of the Western Psychological Association, Irvine, CA (2008), available at http://www-rohan.
sdsu.edu/~tdevos/thd/Obama_Clinton_WPA08.pdf.
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British Prime Minister Tony Blair with American identity more readily than
Barack Obama.190
Another study by Thierry Devos, Kelly Gavin, and Francisco J.
Quintana demonstrated the same effect with respect to Latinos, showing that
both Caucasian Americans and Latino Americans implicitly and explicitly
perceive Latino Americans as less American than Caucasian Americans, al-
though the association between Caucasian and American identity was
weaker among Latino Americans than Caucasian Americans.191  This study,
like the others, “suggests that a very basic right to a national identity is not
equally accessible to all Americans,” as “national identity is more readily
granted to members of the dominant ethnic group than to members of an
ethnic minority.”192
Each of these studies points to ingroup projection as a central challenge
to recategorization based on American identity.  Ingroup projection de-
scribes the propensity of individuals to view their ingroup as prototypical of
a superordinate category.193  Groups that enjoy more power or higher status
are the ones likely to be seen as prototypical of a superordinate category, as
opposed to lower status groups.194  When norms associated with the ingroup
become associated with the superordinate group, ingroup members will per-
ceive outgroup members who do not exhibit these norms as deviants from
the superordinate group and will discriminate against them in order to main-
tain a positive ingroup stereotype.195  Since the motive for discrimination in
this situation is to protect positive ingroup stereotypes, rather than to pre-
serve distinctiveness, ingroup projection appears only “when there is high
identification at both the subgroup and superordinate levels of
categorization.”196
In explaining their results regarding perceptions of African Americans
and Asian Americans, Devos and Banaji postulated that “White Americans
190 Thierry Devos, Debbie Ma, & Travis Gaffud, Is Barack Obama American Enough To
Be The Next President? The Role of Ethnicity and National Identity in American Politics,
Poster Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Personality and Social Psychology,
Albuquerque, New Mexico (2008); see also Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit
Bias, Election ’08, and the Myth of a Post-Racial America, 37 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 659, 659
(2010) (arguing that “the 2008 election calls for enhancing and maintaining efforts to ensure
that civil rights laws address less virulent, but persistent, forms of racism that persist in
America today”).
191 Thierry Devos, Kelly Gavin, & Francisco J. Quintana, Say “Adios” to the American
Dream?  The Interplay Between Ethnic and National Identity Among Latino and Caucasian
Americans, 16 CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 37 (2010).
192 Id.
193 See Michael Wenzel et al., Superordinate Identities and Intergroup Conflict: The In-
group Projection Model, 18 EUR. REV. SOCIAL PSY. 331, 342-47 (2007); Ulrike Weber, Ame´-
lie Mummendey & Sven Walzdus, Perceived Legitimacy of Intergroup Status Differences: Its
Prediction By Relative Ingroup Prototypicality, 32 EUR. J. SOCIAL PSY. 449, 452 (2002).
194 Sven Walzdus et al., Of Bikers, Teachers and Germans: Groups’ Diverging Views
About Their Prototypicality, 43 BRITISH J. SOCIAL PSY. 385 , 396-98 (2004).
195 Crisp, supra note 17, at 516; see also Gaertner, Dovidio & Houlette, supra note 17, at R
537 (“Members of the other subgroup may be seen not only as inferior examples but also as
deviants who justly deserve unequal and possibly harsh treatment.”).
196 Crisp, supra note 17, at 516. R
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are construed as prototypical exemplars of the category American.” 197  Like-
wise, Devos, Gavin and Quintana reasoned that “Caucasian Americans are
viewed as being more prototypical of the American identity than Latino
Americans,” as expected under the theory of ingroup projection, due to dif-
ferences in power and status.198  In short, “some individuals are relegated at
the margin of the American identity because their group does not fit its pro-
totypical definition.”199
Additional studies show that minorities, including Asian Americans,
Latinos and African Americans, are often aware of their perpetual foreigner
status,200 and that such awareness corresponds to greater tension between
their ethnic and national identities,201 a lower sense of belonging,202 and, to a
lesser extent, psychological problems, such as depression among Latinos and
lower hope or life satisfaction among Asian Americans.203  These results
suggest that ethnic minorities’ “awareness of being perceived as not Ameri-
can may ultimately inhibit their ability to feel like they belong in America or
lead to a relative dis-identification with mainstream American culture,” hav-
ing “implications for [their] participation in civic life, including voting,
volunteerism, military service, and other aspects of citizen involvement, all
of which are bolstered by a sense of identification with the group (in this
case, the American identity).”204  If minority groups do not identify as Amer-
icans because of their experiences of exclusion, they are even more likely to
197 Devos & Banaji, supra note 182, at 464. R
198 Devos, Gavin & Quintana, supra note 191, at 46.  They noted, however, that “Cauca- R
sian Americans claim a greater relative prototypicality than they are granted by Latino Ameri-
cans.” Id.
199 Id.
200 Que-Lam Huynh, Thierry Devos, & Laura Smalarz, Perpetual Foreigner in One’s Own
Land: Potential Implications For Identity and Psychological Adjustment, 30 J. SOC. AND
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 133, 154 (2011); see also S. Cheryan & B. Monin, Where Are You Really
From?: Asian Americans and Identity  Denial, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY. 717-30 (2005)
(finding that Asian Americans were aware of being denied an American identity by others);
K.M. Barlow, D.M. Taylor, W.E. Lambert, Ethnicity in America and Feeling “American,” 134
J. PSY. 581-600 (2000) (finding that Africana American and Cuban American women reported
feeling excluded from the national category by European Americans).
201 Huynh et al., supra note 200, at 155; see also V. Benet-Martinez & J. Haritatos, Bicul- R
tural Identity Integration (BII): Components and Psychosocial Antecedents, 73 J. PERSONAL-
ITY 1015, 1039-40 (2005) (finding that perceived discrimination among Chinese Americans
predicted a greater sense of conflict between ethnic and national identities).
202 Huynh et al., supra note 200, at 155; see also S. Levin, C. Van Laar, & W. Foote, R
Ethnic Segregation and Perceived Discrimination in College: Mutual Influences and Effects
on Social and Academic Life, 36 J. APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 1471-1501 (2006) (finding a
relationship between perceived discrimination and a lower sense of belonging among Latino
college students).
203 Huynh et al, supra note 200, at 156; see also P.R. Smokowski, & M.L. Bacallao, R
Acculturation, Internalizing Mental Health Symptoms, and Self-Esteem: Cultural Experiences
of Latino Adolescents in North Carolina, 37 CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND HUMAN DEV. 273, 287
(2007) (finding that perceived discrimination related to higher levels of internalizing problems
and lower self esteem among Latino adolescents in North Carolina).
204 Huynh et al, supra note 200, at 155-56. R
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be seen as perpetual foreigners, creating a vicious cycle of exclusion and
alienation from American identity.205
These studies demonstrating the lasting influence of the association be-
tween American identity and Whiteness, as well as its negative impact on
how minorities feel about themselves, indicate that recategorization as
“Americans” will not be an easy path to reducing intergroup bias:  “To the
extent that members of minority ethnic groups feel that ‘America’ does not
include them, the concept is of little use as an overarching category.”206
Moreover, “[w]hen members of subordinate groups are not equal partici-
pants in the society, attempts to include them in the superordinate category
of the country as a whole are unlikely to contribute to better intergroup
relations.”207
As Bill Ong Hing warned nearly two decades ago, “the continued defi-
nition of American in Euro-centric terms is fraught with danger,” because it
cultivates resentment of immigrants, facilitates scapegoating people of color,
reinforces racial and ethnic epithets, and leads to hate violence.208  Devos
and Banaji, from the far field of implicit social cognition, now echo Hing’s
warning, noting that the American = White effect may foster “‘exclusion-
ary patriotism,’” whereby stronger American identity corresponds with “an-
tagonism toward ethnic minorities” and their exclusion from the national
identity.209
How, then, do we achieve a more expansive definition of American
identity, one based on “[t]he concept . . . of addition rather than omis-
sion”?210  One helpful fact is that ingroup projection is not an all-or-nothing
phenomenon, as “the extent to which projection occurs varies, depending
upon the inter-related characteristics of the multiple identities involved.”211
Accordingly, as the racial and cultural composition of the United States
changes (and it is changing rapidly towards a “minority majority” coun-
try),212 the categories of “White” and “American” may become less and less
205 Miles Hewstone et al., Multiple Soc. Categorization: Integrative Themes and Future
Research Priorities, in MULTIPLE SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION 293 (2006) (“If the minority group
do[sic] not identify with the host group, they are unlikely to see, or be seen, [sic] by the host
group as a partial ingroup member, or as having a superordinate common identity in addition
to their individual group memberships . . . placing limits on the impact of integration for
intergroup relations.” (emphasis added)).
206 Phinney & Alipuria, supra note 172, at 232. R
207 Id.
208 Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation, supra note 15, at 906-07. R
209 Devos & Banaji, supra note 182, at 464. R
210 Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation, supra note 15, at 907. R
211 Crisp, supra note 17, at 516. R
212 Christopher Edley Jr., Forward, in TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COLOR LINES, supra note
188, at viii; see also Phinney and Alipuria, supra note 172, at 224-25 (describing how the R
number of interracial persons in the U.S. is rising, especially among the younger population,
making it increasingly difficult to assign people to a single group), 231 (discussing how 90%
of African American and Mexican American adolescents in a 1997 study considered them-
selves bicultural).  The increasing number of multiracial and multicultural individuals in the
U.S. can help “break down the distances and tensions among preexisting groups and improve
intergroup relations.” Id. at 234.  By expressing their multiple identities, these individuals
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correlated, causing the ingroup projection effect to fade away. In other
words, an “American” superordinate identity—or dual identities such as
“Chinese American” and “Mexican American”—will be effective at reduc-
ing intergroup bias to the extent that being “American” becomes unrelated
to Whiteness.213
Another reason for optimism relates to research indicating that the
American = White effect can be modified through changes in context.
While the American = White effect is normally quite strong, it can be varied
by manipulating the information available about the relevant subgroups.214
Specifically, positive portrayals of the non White subgroup (in this experi-
ment, African Americans) leads to their inclusion in White Americans’ con-
ceptualizations of the category “American,” thereby reducing the American
= White effect.215  Conversely, negative portrayals of the non-White sub-
group leads to their exclusion from White Americans’ conceptualization of
“American,” thereby increasing the American = White effect.216  Thus, the
inclusion or exclusion of a group from a superordinate category will depend,
at least in part, on how favorably the group is portrayed.217 Consequently,
immigration reforms that help change and improve the context in which im-
migrant minorities are seen—for example, by preventing their detention and
deportation and by increasing their opportunities for education and employ-
ment—can play an important role in eroding the American = White effect.
Moreover, once a minority group is included in the “American” superordi-
nate group (e.g. through the spread of enough favorable information), the
“American” identity will amplify the importance of the favorable informa-
tion, increasing positive evaluations and behavior towards the minority
group and reducing reliance on stereotypes.218
The importance of context in moderating the ingroup projection effect
is confirmed by a study examining how Italians and Germans relate to a
“European” superordinate identity.219  This study found that “changing the
intergroup context had a strong impact on the features associated with the
superordinate category.”220  For example, in the context of German and Ital-
ian intergroup relations, Germans spontaneously projected traits such as “or-
ganized” and “disciplined” (which are stereotypically associated with
“may eventually influence others to see that the boundaries and categories that have defined
American society are more fluid than has been assumed.” Id.
213 See Crisp, supra note 17, at 516 (explaining that when categories are uncorrelated,
“there is no way that one can be seen as normative of the other and no way that someone could
perceive one of their groups as representative of the other”).
214 Robert J. Rydell & David L. Hamilton, Thierry Devos, Now They Are American, Now
They Are Not: Valence As A Determinant of the Inclusion of African Americans in the Ameri-
can Identity, 28 SOC. COGNITION 161, 175 (2010).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 176.
218 Id. at 176-77.
219 Mauro Bianchi et al., What Do You Mean By “European”? Evidence of Spontaneous
Ingroup Projection, 36 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 960, 971 (2010).
220 Id. at 970.
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German identity and contrast with stereotypes about Italian identity) onto the
superordinate European identity.221  In the context of British and German
relations, however, Germans did not project these same traits onto European
identity.  Instead, they spontaneously projected traits such as “easygoing”
and “sociable” that more clearly counter stereotypes about British iden-
tity.222  By demonstrating shifts in the traits projected onto the superordinate
identity, these results provide additional evidence that the association be-
tween “White” and “American” can change, depending on the context.
2. Past Legalization Programs as Partial Attempts at
Recategorization
Thus far, attempts at recategorization through immigration reforms –
other than through simple repeals of discriminatory laws – have been ex-
tremely limited in nature.  While Congress has adopted various legalization
programs over the years, these usually apply only to select nationalities and
provide special types of protection rather than representing a more genera-
lized effort to expand the reach of American identity.223  Most are also rela-
tively small in scale, given the total size of the undocumented population.224
During the course of U.S. history, Congress has passed only two general
legalization programs – the Registry Act of 1929 and the Immigration Con-
trol and Reform Act of 1986 – both of which proved shortsighted in their
exclusion of large numbers of people and failed to achieve recategorization.
The Registry Act of 1929 permitted legalization of those who entered
before July 1, 1921, demonstrated good moral character, and paid $20.225  In
passing this law, Congress aimed to assist members of its White ingroup
whose unlawful presence in the U.S. was characterized as a “mere . . . tech-
nical irregularity.”226  The law “did not formally favor Europeans over Mex-
icans,” but 80 percent of the 115,000 immigrants who registered under the
Act between 1930 and 1940 were European or Canadian.227  Although
221 Id. at 969-71.
222 Id.
223 See generally Donald M. Kerwin, Migration Policy Institute, Policy Brief, “More Than
IRCA: US Legalization Programs and the Current Policy Debate,” December 2010, available
at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/legalization-historical.pdf.
224 For example, the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA)
helped 67,092 people adjust their status to permanent residents between 1999 and 2009; the
Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) helped 30,476 people adjust status during
the same period; and the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 helped 53,088 people adjust
status between 1993 and 2009.  In addition, 91,575 parolees of Soviet/Indochinese origin be-
came permanent residents between 1991 and 2009.  The largest special program for a particu-
lar national group is for Cuban refugees; this program helped 405,787 Cubans adjust status
between 1986 and 2000, as well as 29,812 of their non-Cuban spouses and children. Id. at 12
(Appendix).
225 NGAI, supra note 106, at 82. R
226 Id.
227 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLA\15\HLA105.txt unknown Seq: 36 27-JUN-12 11:03
164 Harvard Latino Law Review [Vol. 15
“many Mexicans qualified for an adjustment of status under the Registry
Act [ ] few knew about it, understood it, or could afford the fee.”228
Since 1929, Congress has twice advanced the date of entry to qualify
for registry, first in 1939 to include those who entered before June 28, 1940
and later in 1986 as part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
to include those who entered before January 1, 1972.  Each time the date
advanced, bursts of legalization occurred followed by periods of decline.
About 200,000 people legalized their status through “registry” between
1929 and 1945, with the number peaking in 1943, and another 50,000 legal-
ized their status during the two years following IRCA.229  Approximately
72,000 people total legalized their status through “registry” between 1986
and 2009.230  Since Congress has never passed legislation to automatically
advance the registry at regular intervals, this program was not designed to
achieve real recategorization and certainly did not have that effect, benefit-
ing only a small fraction of the undocumented population.231
By far, the largest legalization programs occurred under IRCA, which
included a general legalization program that led to adjustment of status for
one and a half million people between 1989 and 2009, as well as a legaliza-
tion program for Special Agricultural Workers, which led to adjustment of
status for another million during the same period.232  Given the Census Bu-
reau’s estimate that there were 3.5-5 million undocumented immigrants in
the U.S. in 1980, about one-half to two-thirds of the undocumented popula-
tion was legalized under IRCA.233  While the Congress that passed the Regis-
try Act was concerned with helping Europeans and Canadians “regularize”
their status, the years of Congressional debates leading up to IRCA were
shaped by the influential 1981 report of the Select Commission on Immigra-
tion and Refugee Policy (SCIRP), which had found that “[t]he existence of
a fugitive underground class is unhealthy for society as a whole and may
contribute to ethnic tensions.”234
Of course, not everyone shared this concern. Senator Alan Simpson (R-
Wyoming), for example, feared that legalizing so many immigrants would
undermine social cohesion.  Specifically, Senator Simpson stated:
If language and cultural separatism rise above a certain level, the
unity and political stability of the nation will, in time, be seriously
eroded.  A common language and a core public culture of certain
shared values, beliefs, and customs makes us distinctly “Ameri-
can.”235  Senator Simpson expressed special concern about the
228 Id.
229 Kerwin, supra note 223, at 4. R
230 Id. at 12.
231 Id. at 4.
232 Id. at 12.
233 SUSAN F. MARTIN, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 203 (2011).
234 Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (1981) (cited in Martin, supra
note 234, at 210).
235 HELENE HAYES, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE UNDOCUMENTED: AMBIVALENT
LAWS, FURTIVE LIVES 54-55 (2001) (emphasis added and internal citation omitted).
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number of immigrants “whose cultural background may seem
more different or more foreign to the bulk of our people than have
past immigrants seemed to the majority population at those
times.”236
Ultimately, the law passed in 1986 followed the main recommendations of
the SCIRP report, rather than Senator Simpson’s approach.  Rather naively,
IRCA attempted a one-time recategorization through a two-pronged ap-
proach that combined a legalization program with sanctions against employ-
ers who hired unauthorized workers.  The idea was that this combination of
policies would incorporate the undocumented immigrants already living
within the U.S. and simultaneously shut the door to future illegal entries.
One of IRCA’s main flaws was that, like the Registry Act, it left out a
large group of people.  Its 1982 cut-off date for entry to the U.S. excluded a
large percentage of the undocumented population,237 and it failed to include
any special provisions for family members who did not independently qual-
ify for legalization.238  A host of other factors imposed additional barriers to
legalization under IRCA, including: disqualifying convictions;239 difficulty
obtaining the necessary documentation to establish qualification; confusion
about the legal requirements;240 inadequate information about the legaliza-
tion program, especially for non-Hispanic communities;241 poor planning and
implementation of the program;242 financial hardship caused by the non-
waivable application fee;243 and fear of immigration authorities.244  Overall,
236 E. Midgley, Comings and Goings in U.S. Immigration Policy, in THE UNAVOIDABLE
ISSUE 66 (D.G. Papademetriou & M.J. Miller, eds., 1983) (emphasis added).
237 HAYES, supra note 235, at 5-6.  Congress adopted almost a five-year period (from the R
cut-off date of January 1, 1982 until November 6, 1986, when IRCA was passed).  8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1986).
238  MARTIN, supra note 233, at 215. R
239 Id.
240 Id.  The agency’s failure to set forth clear legal standards and its narrow interpretations
of some of the statutory language led to two major class-action lawsuits that did not reach a
settlement until 2004.  Donald Kerwin & Charles Wheeler, The Center for Migration Studies,
The Case for Legalization, Lessons From 1986, Recommendations For the Future, in ISSUES IN
IMMIGR. 18 (2004).
241 Kerwin & Wheeler, supra note 240, at 15 (stating that “most of the advertising about R
legalization targeted the Hispanic market, leaving non-Hispanics largely in the dark”); see also
id. at 18 (noting that “a disproportionate percentage of Hispanics applied [for legalization
compared to] other ethnic groups”).
242 The INS had only “six months to plan, design and implement” the legalization pro-
gram. MICHAEL C. LEMAY, ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC POLICY: THE REFORM OF CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW 68 (1994).  Consequently, numerous problems emerged during
the implementation process, including long delays in setting up Qualified Designated Entities
to assist people in applying for legalization, inaccurate interpretations of the rules, and “com-
plaints that INS staff were ‘subjective,’ ‘rude,’ ‘racist,’ and’ insensitive’ to clients.” HAYES,
supra note 235, at 68.  Moreover, since Congress failed to establish clear standards for ob- R
taining QED status, many “notarios” and other for-profit consultants obtained QED status
without necessarily having the qualifications to provide proper assistance. Kerwin & Wheeler,
supra note 240, at 14. R
243 Kerwin & Wheeler, supra note 240, at 16-17.  The application cost $185 for an adult R
and $50 for a child, and had a family cap of $420. Id.
244 Id. at 13.
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“far fewer people applied for general amnesty than the four million the
agency had anticipated.”245  Meanwhile, employer sanctions completely
failed to stop more undocumented immigrants from entering the U.S., so the
number of undocumented immigrants kept growing.246
In the wake of IRCA, immigration scholars such as Linda Bosniak pre-
dicted that the law’s effects would ultimately support the exclusion of un-
documented immigrants rather than promote their membership in society:
“[A]lthough the undocumented immigrant will remain among us, she will
live and work within a shrinking sphere of membership. At the same time,
her growing marginalization will serve to further fragment and stratify the
larger membership community.”247  In particular, Bosniak recognized that
the new rules under IRCA “promise[d] both to rearrange and to curtail the
limited sphere of membership the undocumented immigrant enjoyed under
the previous regime.”248  Michael Wishnie has expressed similar concerns
about a legalization program, and has warned that, “one can expect that
undocumented workers will face ever more onerous conditions, in even
more isolated circumstances, and that the worst sweatshop employers will
have an even deeper incentive to prefer such vulnerable workers over lawful
U.S. workers, regardless of the possible civil penalty they may face.”249
Empirical studies have confirmed this perspective by showing that
those who remained undocumented after IRCA were “in a more dispos-
sessed and desperate state than prior to the implementation of IRCA.”250
Moreover, comparing undocumented immigrants with those who legalized
their status under IRCA reveals significant gaps in education level, employ-
ment, shared living space and monthly income.251  Undocumented immi-
grants who legalized their status earned more money, had fewer experiences
of homelessness, and had more benefits, such as health insurance, a private
retirement plan, and life insurance.252  Those who remained undocumented
not only had greater economic needs, but also had greater social needs, as
illustrated by statistically significant differences in depression, stress, health,
and marital and family relations.253  Thus, by leaving a large percentage of
245 Id. at 18.
246 Id. at 8; Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration
Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L. J. 1723, 1760 (2010).
247 Linda Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 1007 (1988).
248 Id. at 1019.
249 Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446, 1460-61
(2008).
250 HAYES, supra note 235, at 126. R
251 Id. at 76-85.
252 Id. at 91-93; Sherrie A. Kossoudji & Deborah A. Cobb-Clark, Coming out of the
Shadow: Learning about Legal Status and Wages from the Legalized Population, 20 J. LAB.
ECON. 598, 598 (2002) (finding that “[t]he wage penalty for being unauthorized is estimated
to range from 14% to 24%” and that “[t]he wage benefit of legalization under IRCA was
approximately 6%”).
253 HAYES, supra note 235, at 88-89. R
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the undocumented population out of its legalization program, IRCA contrib-
uted to the creation of a new, disadvantaged subclass.
The experience of IRCA and warnings of immigration scholars such as
Bosniak and Wishnie stress that legalization is not a clear path to recat-
egorization. If improperly implemented or combined with policies that fur-
ther stigmatize the remaining undocumented population, a legalization
program may even have the opposite effect of increasing category salience
and intergroup bias.  Whenever certain subgroups are recategorized as part
of a superordinate identity, other subgroups will inevitably be left out.254
Indeed, U.S. history is replete with examples of situations where extending
membership to one group led to stigmatization of another group.255
Given that recategorization often creates new outgroups, the broader
the reach of any proposed legalization program, the better.  Due to the cur-
rent political climate, however, many immigrants’ rights advocates have fo-
cused on narrower, less controversial legalization programs such as the
DREAM Act (for students) or AgJobs (for farmworkers).  These programs
would achieve, at best, a partial recategorization.
At a minimum, any legalization program designed to promote recat-
egorization should not repeat the mistakes of IRCA by unnecessarily creat-
ing new outgroups.  Such a program should allow for ongoing integration of
the undocumented population, rather than require people to establish eligi-
bility at a single point in time.  For example, allowing undocumented immi-
grants to apply for legal status at any point after they meet certain criteria,
such as establishing physical presence or good moral character for a certain
number of years, would build flexibility into the program and avoid the
harsh exclusionary rules that automatically create new outgroups.  Moreo-
ver, any future legalization program should avoid replicating IRCA’s errors
by (1) providing legal status to derivative family members at the same time
as the primary applicant; (2) setting forth clear legal standards and reasona-
ble evidentiary requirements; (3) advertising to a wide range of ethnic
groups while meeting their needs in the application process; and (4) allowing
a fee waiver.
254 ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, WHO COUNTS AS AN AMERICAN? THE BOUNDARIES OF NA-
TIONAL IDENTITY 74 (2009); see also Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 501 (2000) (critiquing nationality-based models of citizenship as
“exclusionary by their nature” because “[t]he very act of normatively privileging identifica-
tion with, and solidarity toward, compatriots presumes the existence of a class of nonnational
others who are necessarily excluded from the domain of normative concern”).
255 Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A
“Magic Mirror” to the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L. J. 1111, 1117 (1998).  Johnson points
out, for example, that when the U.S. formally extended legal rights to African Americans by
passing the Fourteenth Amendment, it denied legal rights to Chinese immigrants, excluding
them from the U.S. and preventing them from obtaining citizenship. Moreover, the same year
that the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, ending racial segregation in
schools, the government launched “Operation Wetback,” a vicious campaign that led to the
mass deportation of tens of thousands of Mexican immigrants as well as U.S. citizens of Mexi-
can descent.
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Even these measures, however, may not be sufficient to achieve recat-
egorization, in part because of the power of ethnicity/race in shaping Ameri-
can identity, discussed above.  A legalization program can provide legal
status, but it alone cannot change perceptions based on ethnicity or race.
Studies by social scientists fail to provide a clear picture of the relationship
between legal status and ethnicity/race in shaping attitudes about immi-
grants.  A 1997 study found that Anglos become more supportive of liberal
immigration policies with increases in the relative size of the legal immi-
grant population where they live. These findings suggest that Anglos react
differently to illegal vs. legal immigrants.256  A more recent study, however,
found that Anglos favor policies restricting immigration even in areas with
substantial levels of native born Latinos, leading to the conclusion that “ra-
cial or ethnic-based concerns may trump worries about legal procedures” in
forming attitudes about immigration.257
Other studies showing that Latinos in particular (as opposed to other
ethnic groups) trigger certain attitudes towards immigration seem to support
the finding that ethnicity/race plays a significant role independent of immi-
gration status.  For example, Efre´n O. Pe´rez found that Whites implicitly
view Latino immigrants more negatively than both European immigrants
and Asian immigrants, although his study did not distinguish between “le-
gal” and “illegal” immigrants.258  Another study found that news featuring
Latinos triggered anxiety and opposition to certain immigration policies be-
cause of the racial or ethnic stigma attached to that group by White Ameri-
cans, rather than due to other factors, such as the sheer size of the Latino
population or its economic position.  Again, however, this study did not spe-
cifically address the role of legal status.259  These studies invite further re-
search about the relationship between race and legal status in shaping
attitudes about immigrants.  Gaining a deeper understanding of this relation-
ship will inform ideas about what role a legalization program can play as a
form of recategorization.
C. Crossed Categorization
The third categorization-based approach to reducing intergroup bias is
crossed categorization, which, as noted above, involves eliciting multiple,
unrelated group identities.  Rendering salient multiple group identities also
“prompts individuals to develop a more complex conceptualization of the
256 M.V. Hood & I.L. Morris, Amigo o Enemigo?: Context, Attitudes, and Anglos’ Public
Opinion Towards Immigration, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 309-23 (1997).
257 Rene R. Rocha et al., Ethnic Context and Immigration Policy Preferences Among Lati-
nos and Anglos, 92 SOC. SCI. Q. 17 (2011).
258 Efre´n O. Pe´rez, Explicit Evidence on the Import of Implicit Attitudes: The IAT and
Immigration Policy Judgments, 32 POL. BEHAV. 517, 528-29 (2010). The White American
subjects in Pere´z’s study showed negative implicit attitudes towards Latino immigrants not
only when compared to White immigrants, but also when compared to Asian immigrants. Id. at
529.
259 Id.
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outgroup, which leads in some cases to decategorization.”260  Here, com-
plexity refers to “an individual’s subjective representation of the interrela-
tionships among his or her multiple group identities.”261  If a person
perceives a high degree of overlap in the typical characteristics associated
with her social category memberships, as well as overlap among the actual
members of those groups, then her subjective representation is low in com-
plexity.  On the other hand, if “each ingroup category is distinct from the
others,” then the representation is high in complexity.262  Studies show that
higher levels of complexity correspond to “greater outgroup tolerance, in-
cluding greater support for affirmative action and multiculturalism.”263 Thus,
the crossed-categorization model proposes reducing bias both by increasing
the number of social groups that people need to process cognitively and by
making the relationship between those categories more complex.  This re-
duction in bias renders simple categories and stereotypes less useful in eval-
uating others, and leads to more individualized appraisals.264
Undocumented immigrants belong to multiple social groups, based on
their immigration status, race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexual orientation,
age, presence of disability, family structure, and employment status.265  U.S.
immigration policies generally obscure these multiple social identities by
making “illegal” status – especially when it results from illegal entry – the
dominant characteristic that defines millions of undocumented immigrants.
The existence of so few avenues for legalizing one’s status after illegal entry
reinforces the illegal entry’s sustained legal and social salience, despite its
representation of just one snapshot in time.266  The overriding importance
that illegal entry and status assume in the immigration context closely paral-
lels how a criminal conviction becomes the most salient aspect of an individ-
ual’s identity.  Those studying the challenges of reentry after a criminal
conviction note that “[t]he status of ex-offender is only one part of the per-
son’s identity, yet it can become the most prominent defining characteristic
260 DONELSON R. FORSYTH, GROUP DYNAMICS 436 (5th ed. 2010) (emphasis added).
261 Crisp, supra note 17, at 517. R
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 517-18.
265 See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigra-
tion Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1553 (1995) (noting that
“the immigrant community is heterogeneous in a number of salient ways”).
266 When Congress eliminated section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, it
terminated one of the main ways that individuals who had entered the U.S. illegally or who
had fallen out of status after a legal entry could become permanent residents through family
relationships or employment.  Now, an even smaller group of undocumented immigrants –
only those who had a visa petition filed on their behalf before April 30, 2001 – can benefit
from 245(i). INA § 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i).  For those who entered illegally and do not
qualify under 245(i), cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents tends to be the only
form of relief available, but, as noted above, this is usually unattainable due to the “excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship” standard.  INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).  Con-
sequently, an undocumented immigrant’s own disability, years of residence in the United
States, family ties, and employment history are generally insufficient to stop a deportation.
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for representing self.”267  In much the same way, once society perceives an
individual as “illegal,” a term that invokes criminality, other aspects of iden-
tity become invisible.
Indeed, many parallels exist between the social exclusions that ex-of-
fenders encounter and those that “illegal” immigrants face.  While ex-of-
fenders who are U.S. citizens do not risk deportation, they face numerous
economic, social, and political collateral consequences of their convictions
at both the federal and state levels.268  These collateral consequences limit
their abilities to vote, to maintain family integrity, and to obtain employ-
ment, education, housing, and public benefits.269  Such “social exclusions
. . . effectively relegate ex-offenders to the margins of legitimate society,
stigmatizing them and further highlighting their separation from law-abiding
members of society.”270  Similarly, immigrants labeled as “illegal” increas-
ingly face exclusion from social spheres as states pass stringent laws to pre-
vent them from renting property, enrolling in school, forming contracts, and
finding employment.271  Such sustained stigmatization reinforces the percep-
tion of the original transgression – be it a conviction or the act of illegal
entry – as an unredeemable offense that will forever define one’s social iden-
tity.272  Thus, both ex-offenders and “illegal aliens” often remain permanent
outcasts, primarily and perpetually defined by their past transgressions.273
While an illegal entry is, in general, extremely difficult to overcome,
the few exceptions that exist (other than under INA § 245(i), noted above)
minimize the visibility of the illegal act by recasting the immigrant as a
267 PATRICIA O’BRIEN, MAKING IT IN THE “FREE WORLD”: WOMEN IN TRANSITION FROM
PRISON 28 (2001).
268 For an overview of the federal statutes imposing collateral consequences upon convic-
tions, please see generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Office of the Pardon Attorney, Federal
Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences Upon Conviction, available at http://www.jus-
tice.gov/pardon/collateral_consequences.pdf.  For an overview of the state statutes imposing
collateral consequences upon convictions, please see generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Office
of the Pardon Attorney, Civil Disabilities of Convicted Felons: A State-by-State Survey, Oct.
1996, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/195110.pdf.
269 See Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
585, 593-99 (2006).
270 Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-offender Reentry, 45
B.C. L. REV. 255, 273 (2004).
271 See Hammon-Beason Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, Ala. H.B. 56
(2011); Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, Ariz. S.B. 1070 (2010).
272 Cf. Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective On the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issued Faced By Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86
B.U. L. REV. 623, 659-60 (2006) (discussing how criminality results in “sustained social
stigmatization”).
273 See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Col-
lateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 160 (1999) (discussing how
collateral consequences “label the ex-offender an ‘outcast,’ and frequently make it impossible
for her ever to regain full societal membership”); George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement As
Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1897 (1999)
(describing those who have served time as “a permanent undercaste of people”). See generally
Regina Austin, “The Shame of It All”: Stigma and the Political Disenfranchisement of For-
merly Convicted and Incarcerated Persons, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 178 (2004).
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victim.  This represents a form of crossed categorization, whereby the law
highlights an alternative social identity based on victimhood.  For example,
immigration reforms have created special paths to permanent residence, de-
spite an illegal entry, for victims of domestic violence, trafficking and other
crimes (through self-petitions under the Violence Against Women Act, T
visas and U visas, respectively);274 children who are eligible for foster care
due to abuse, neglect or abandonment (through Special Immigration Juvenile
Status);275 and individuals who have experienced persecution or who have a
well-founded fear of future persecution on account of certain protected
grounds (through asylum).276  Providing these groups with the opportunity to
gain legal status complicates the view of undocumented immigrants as sim-
ply “illegal” by bringing out more sympathetic aspects of their identities,
most notably their vulnerability and victimhood, often related to their gender
and age.  As Hiroshi Motomura points out, “much current debate about the
way immigration law treats victims of domestic violence, trafficking, and
other criminal activity amounts to a debate about whether to protect these
migrants, even if they lack lawful presence, by imagining them in a category
apart from immigration outside the law.” 277  Relying on a simplistic victim/
criminal dichotomy to overcome illegal entry, however, raises serious con-
cerns because this dichotomy ignores the overlap between these two catego-
ries and because the immigration statute recognizes only limited forms of
victimhood, rendering invisible many forms of oppression.  After discussing
these concerns, this section examines how immigrants’ rights advocates are
moving past the victim/criminal dichotomy and promoting more progressive
forms of crossed categorization by organizing around immigrants’ alternative
social identities as workers and students.
274 See INA § 101(a)(51), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(51) (defining petitioners under the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA)); INA § 101(a)(15)(T), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (defining
noncitizens who qualify for T visas as trafficking survivors); INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(U) (defining noncitizens who qualify for U visas for crime victims).
275 See INA § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (defining noncitizens who qualify
for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status).
276 See INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defining a “refugee”); see also Hiroshi
Motomura, What Is “Comprehensive Immigration Reform”? Taking the Long View, 63 ARK. L.
REV. 225, 235-36 (2010) (noting that “America’s proud tradition as a refuge for those fleeing
persecution is so deeply rooted that we often forget the way many of them arrived – without
papers”). Motomura points out that other programs that create paths to legalization for certain
groups are based on the principles of refugee and asylum protection, including the Nicaraguan
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) and the Haitian Refugee immigra-
tion Fairness Act (HRIFA). Id.  The numbers of immigrants who became permanent residents
through these forms of legalization are relatively negligible. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2010, Table 7, available at http://www.dhs.gov/
files/statistics/publications/LPR10.shtm.  In 2010, 248 immigrants became permanent re-
sidents through NACARA and 386 immigrants became residents through HRIFA (these num-
bers include principals and their family members). Id.
277 Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, supra note 16, at 2086 (emphasis added). R
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1. Limitations of Relying on Victimhood as an Alternative Social
Identity
Relying on limited notions of victimhood to remove a small subclass of
undocumented immigrants from the shadow of “illegality” is problematic
for several reasons.  To begin with, characterizing people as victims associ-
ates them with weakness and can further undermine their social status.278  As
Angela Harris has noted, “[the] story of woman as victim is meant to en-
courage solidarity by emphasizing women’s shared oppression, thus denying
or minimizing difference,” but this story also “denies the ability of women
to shape their own lives” and “may thwart their abilities” to “create their
own self-definitions.”279  Similarly, bell hooks has criticized using shared
victimization as a concept that unites women because “[s]exist ideology
teaches women that to be female is to be a victim.”280  The immigration
statute provides unique paths to legal status for women who demonstrate
victimhood, even if they entered the U.S illegally, but offers no comparable
paths to women who have established successful careers, stable families, or
otherwise displayed strength and self-determination.  By rewarding vic-
timhood but not self-empowerment, the immigration statute reinforces the
sexist ideology that the most deserving women are those who are most
vulnerable.
Second, there is no true divide between victims and criminals, as “it is
the rare perpetrator who has not also suffered.”281  Abbe Smith aptly de-
scribes “the ‘cycle of violence’ that transforms victims into perpetrators,”
arguing that the people who experience terrible things and those who com-
mit terrible acts are often the same people.282  She contends that “[t]hose
who claim to care about victims of child abuse, sexual assault, and domestic
violence and who abandon them when they repeat the behavior by acting out
against others fail to make these critical connections.”283 Smith therefore
critiques the “prevailing feminist approach to crime and violence” as being
“too narrowly focused on victims” and “contribut[ing] to the nation’s ex-
traordinary and exclusive turn to punishment over the past three decades.”284
The immigration statute, which creates special paths to U.S. citizenship
for certain types of victims while simultaneously attaching extremely harsh
consequences to even minor criminal offenses, including deportability and
278 KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VIC-
TIMS 76 (1988).
279 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581, 613 (1990).
280 BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 45 (1984).
281 Abbe Smith, The “Monster” in All of US: When Victims Become Perpetrators, 38 SUF-
FOLK U. L. REV. 367, 369 (2005).
282 Id. at 370, 393.
283 Id. at 393.  Smith vividly describes how “feminists and others who claim to care about
raped and abused women suddenly jump ship and head for the hills the minute a raped and
abused woman becomes a perpetrator.” Id. at 386.
284 Id. at 370.
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ineligibility for many forms of relief, similarly fails to recognize the connec-
tion between acts of abuse and acts of aggression.  While immigration laws
do permit waivers of various criminal offenses in applying for T visas, U
visas, VAWA self-petitions, and VAWA cancellation of removal, the scope of
the waiver is different for each type of application, reflecting an incoherent
and inconsistent approach to handling cases where the victim is also a
criminal.
For example, the statutory provisions pertaining to the U visa for vic-
tims of certain crimes provide a discretionary waiver of all grounds of inad-
missibility except for Nazis or perpetrators of genocide, torture or
extrajudicial killings.285 The statutory waiver for T visas is more limited,
excluding all security-related grounds, as well as international child abduc-
tors, and former citizens who renounced citizenship to avoid taxation.286
Moreover, the statute indicates that criminal grounds of inadmissibility may
only be waived for trafficking victims if the crimes were “caused by, or
were incident to, the victimization,” although the regulation uses more leni-
ent language.287  There is no obvious reason why the scope of waivers should
be different for victims of trafficking and victims of other types of crimes,
suggesting an incoherent approach to the question of what to do when a
victim is also a criminal.
The statutory provisions pertaining to VAWA cancellation of removal,
which is a special form of cancellation for victims of domestic abuse, further
underscore this internal inconsistency.  This form of relief excludes those
who are subject to any criminal ground of deportability, as well as the
grounds of deportability related to document fraud, false claims of U.S. citi-
zenship, and security.288 A discretionary waiver is available only if the alien
“was not the primary perpetrator of violence in the relationship” and the
immigration judge determines that the alien was acting in self-defense, vio-
lated a protection order designed for the alien’s own protection, or commit-
ted a crime that did not result in serious bodily injury and that was connected
to the alien’s having been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty.289 The
waiver also appears to exclude anyone who is deportable based on an aggra-
vated felony.290 This patchwork of waivers for different types of victims
285 INA § 212(d)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(14) (providing a discretionary waiver for all
grounds of inadmissibility except for those who are Nazis or perpetrators of genocide, torture,
extrajudicial killings).
286 INA § 212(d)(13)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(13)(B)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R.
212.16(b)(1).
287 INA § 212(d)(13)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(13)(B)(ii). The regulation, however, pro-
vides that “[s] pecial consideration will be given to the granting of a waiver . . . where the
activities rendering the alien inadmissible were caused by or incident to the victimization.”  8
C.F.R. 212.16(b)(1) (emphasis added). This language differs from the text of the statute, as it
suggests that a connection is not required but that the existence of such a connection simply
weighs in favor of granting the waiver.
288 INA § 240A(2)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(2)(A)(iv).
289 INA § 240A(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(5); INA 237(a)(7)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(7)(A).
290 INA § 240A(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(5).
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shows, at best, a deep ambivalence about how to handle aliens who fail to fit
neatly into a simple, stereotypical category of “victim” or “criminal.”
Furthermore, recognizing “victimhood” only in these narrow types of
cases is problematic because it renders invisible the multiple forms of op-
pression that other undocumented immigrants face, including extreme pov-
erty, exploitation as workers, and disparities due to other aspects of their
identities such as race, class, gender, or sexual orientation.  Since qualifying
for the exceptional forms of relief offered by T visas, U visas, VAWA peti-
tions, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, and asylum often involves showing
that one is a victim of physical, sexual or psychological harm, the focus
remains on individual injury rather than on a “more complex socio-political
analysis” of oppression.291
In addition, investing in “an identity of injury” limits our “political
imagination and . . . ability to stake out more transformative political
claims.”292  Thus, instead of challenging the fundamental characterization of
undocumented immigrants as criminals and the severe obstacle that illegal
entry presents for obtaining legal status, immigrants’ rights advocates may
simply seek special exceptions for a relatively minuscule number of cases.
While there are an estimated twelve million undocumented immigrants in
the United States, in 2010 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service ap-
proved just 6,274 VAWA self-petitions based on domestic abuse, 638 T visas
for victims of trafficking and their family members, 11,779 U visas for vic-
tims of certain crimes and their family members, and 1,480 J visas for spe-
cial immigrant juveniles.293  Thus, less than one percent of undocumented
immigrants were able to legalize their status through one of these special
avenues.
Imagining a more transformative political claim might well include
bringing to light other aspects of immigrants’ identities, distinct from indi-
vidual victimhood, as relevant to the determination of whether they should
be allowed to remain in the United States.  Immigrants’ rights advocates
have actively organized around two such alternative identities – as workers
and as students – that move beyond the traditional victim/criminal
dichotomy.
291 Cf. Vasuki Nesiah, The Specter of Violence That Haunts the UDHR: The Turn to Ethics
and Expertise, 24 MD. J. INT’L L. 135, 150 (2009) (arguing that the focus on sexual violence in
conflict situations “privileges bodily integrity injuries . . . rather than any more complex socio-
political analysis of these conflicts”).  Recent guidance indicating that the Department of La-
bor may certify U visa applications based on certain crimes related to labor exploitation repre-
sents one positive step forward in moving beyond physical injuries towards a more expansive
definition of oppression. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, U Visa Process and Protocols Question
Answer, available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/whd20110619-qa.pdf.
292 Nesiah, supra note 291, at 150. R
293 U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Form I-914 Application for T Nonimmi-
grant Status and Form I-918 Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status Visa Service-Wide Receipts,
Completions, and Pending, Fiscal Year 2002 Through Fiscal Year 2011 (April 2011), available
at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/Reports/Forms-Data/i-914-T-I-918-data-2011-april.
pdf; see also Visa Statistics for VAWA, T and U, available at http://immigrationroad.com/visa/
visa-statistics-for-VAWA-U-T.php.
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2. Moving Past the Victim/Criminal Dichotomy
a. Worker-Based Identities
Policies that recognize and protect undocumented immigrants’ identities
as workers move away from the victim/criminal dichotomy and can poten-
tially boost both the social and legal status of eight million working undocu-
mented immigrants, as well as their families.294  Recognizing that
undocumented immigrants are already embedded in U.S. society and con-
tributing to the economy complicates the image of the “illegal alien” as an
outsider, criminal or interloper.  As Jennifer Gordon and Robin Lenhardt
have argued, “work functions as an important pathway to citizenship as a
form of belonging.”295  Consequently, “new migrants may more easily be
able to gain legitimacy as political actors when they are understood as work-
ers (rather than, say, as recipients of public benefits or as consumers of edu-
cation and health care).”296
Worker centers provide several examples of successful organizing cam-
paigns that protect immigrants’ dignity by highlighting their identities as
workers.  Jennifer Gordon, for example, has described how immigrant mem-
bers of the Workplace Project, many of whom were undocumented, man-
aged to obtain the support of conservative New York legislators, who had
actively supported anti-immigrant measures, by sharing stories of their lives
as workers and thus persuading the state legislature to pass a law that dra-
matically increased the penalty for employers who failed to pay proper
wages.297  Another successful campaign involved the Garment Worker
Center in Los Angeles, which helped mostly immigrant garment workers
organize a national campaign and bring litigation that led to the creation of a
standard of conduct for retailers and manufacturers.298 Under this new stan-
dard of conduct, retailers and manufacturers must ensure that their garment
contractors comply with labor laws and health and safety standards.299 The
294 Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Pew Hispanic Ctr., Report: A Portrait of Unautho-
rized Immigrants in the United States 1 (2009) (stating that the U.S. has about 154 million
workers, of whom about 8 million are undocumented immigrants), available at http://pew
hispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf.
295 Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. REV.
1161, 1191 (2008).
296 Id. at 1218.  As Gordon has recognized, however, focusing on a “worker” identity may
result in further stigmatizing those who receive public benefits. JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN
SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 276-77 (2005).
297 GORDON, supra note 296, at 237-80. R
298 Victor Narro, Finding the Synergy Between Law and Organizing: Experiences From
the Streets of Los Angeles, 35 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 339, 357 (2008).  Similarly, the carwash
workers campaign in Los Angeles, organized by a coalition involving a novel partnership
between the AFL-CIO and the National Day Laborers Organizing Network (NDLON), ex-
posed widespread worker abuses in the carwash industry, garnered support to renew a law that
protected vulnerable carwash workers, and helped bring civil and criminal charges against the
owners of multiple car washes for violating state laws. Id. at 367. See generally Justice for
Carwash Workers, http://www.cleancarwashla.org/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
299 Narro, supra note 298, at 357.
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garment workers’ campaign also led Los Angeles to pass a tough anti-sweat-
shop law that has served as a model for other cities.300
These examples of successful organizing by worker centers indicate
that immigrants, even if undocumented, have a powerful worker identity that
can serve as a catalyst not only for coalition-building but also for achieving
significant legal victories that improve their statuses at their jobs and in their
communities.  As Victor Narro notes, worker centers have “impacted the
way the media reports and the way the larger public perceives immigrant
and low-wage worker issues . . . changing the climate and altering the terms
of debate at the local level.”301
Worker centers promote crossed categorization in a number of ways.
Not only do they highlight their constituents’ roles as workers, but they also
coalesce their membership around other aspects of identity.  In Los Angeles,
for example, all worker centers involve a high percentage of undocumented
immigrants,302 but define themselves based on ethnicity (e.g., the Pilipino
Worker Center (PWC)), geography (e.g., the Koreatown Immigrant Workers
Alliance (KIWA)), occupation (e.g., the National Day Laborers’ Organizing
Network (NDLON)) and industry (e.g., the Garment Worker Center
(GWC)).303  Some worker centers also highlight gender by focusing entirely
on women in female-dominated industries and by explicitly incorporating
discussions about gender oppression in their work (e.g., the GWC in Los
Angeles and Asian Immigrant Women’s Advocates (AIWA) in San
Francisco).
A commitment to multiethnic organizing among some worker centers
further undermines simplistic, stereotypical categorizations based on race or
ethnicity.304 KIWA, for example, never considered working only with Kore-
ans since each workplace in Los Angeles’ Koreatown employs both Koreans
and Latinos.305  Likewise, the GWC focuses on recruiting and organizing
both Chinese and Latina garment workers, even ensuring proportionate rep-
resentation by both groups on its board.306  Bringing immigrants and African
Americans together has proven more challenging, although there have been
some positive developments on this front as well.307
300 Id.
301 Ruth Milkman, Introduction, in WORKING FOR JUSTICE: THE L.A. MODEL OF ORGANIZ-
ING AND ADVOCACY 16 (Ruth Milkman, Joshua Bloom, & Victor Narro, eds. 2010) (quoting
Victor Narro).
302 In Los Angeles, immigrants comprise over a third of the population and half of the
workforce.  About one million of the nation’s 11-12 million undocumented immigrants live in
the L.A. metropolitan area, the vast majority of whom are Latino and work in low-wage sec-
tors with widespread violations. Id. at 6.
303 Id. at 2.
304 JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE
DREAM  61 (2006).
305 Id. at 61-665.
306 Id.
307 Fine notes that “[i]n its childcare work, TSWC [the Tenants’ and Workers’ Support
Committee] has built a base of African Americans, South Asians, Haitians, and Latinos, and
there are very explicit discussions about race and the need to come together as people of
color.” Id. at 67. See also Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 295. R
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In Los Angeles, the metropolitan area with the largest concentration of
undocumented immigrants in the United States, unions and workers centers
have developed “a shared strategic repertoire.”308 This repertoire includes
“producing compelling narratives that include the stories and voices of low-
wage workers themselves, and framing claims in the moral language of so-
cial justice.”309 Thus, shifting the focus from immigrant to worker identity is
a conscious part of the organizing strategy.  The civil rights movement for
immigrants has astutely “redrawn the parameters of the debate” by “ex-
pos[ing] a new axis: the struggle of ordinary workers and their families to
be treated equally, as human beings, and as workers with full rights.”310
Recognizing the positive benefits of highlighting a “worker” identity
should not, however, lead to romanticizing or overgeneralizing the social
status that it can create. Gordon and Lenhardt stress that “some low-wage
worksites have more capacity to lead to a sense of belonging and to serve as
a site for citizenship’s exercise than others” and that “the same work done
by different people will not necessarily deliver the same citizenship value to
both.”311  They note that undocumented immigrants who work in the U.S.
and send remittances home often gain greater social status in their home
countries than in the U.S, at least at first.312  Over time, however, work can
also increase their social status in the U.S., especially if they are unionized
or active with a worker center: “The more migrants participate politically
through unions, worker centers, and marches, the deeper their sense of be-
longing becomes.”313  Thus, despite how migrant work is sometimes used as
“a rallying cry for who those who would curtail immigration,” Gordon and
Lenhardt conclude that “on balance, even for undocumented immigrants,
work facilitates incorporation into the polity over time and thus serves as a
pathway to citizenship.”314
Highlighting undocumented immigrants’ social identities as workers
has the potential to promote social cohesion by showing that they are real
people contributing to the community and fulfilling important labor needs,
rather than being part of an abstract problem called “illegal immigration.”315
To the extent that our laws and policies undermine the formation of a worker
identity by denying undocumented immigrants adequate restitution for labor
violations,316 supporting worksite raids,317 allowing employers to hide behind
308 Milkman, supra note 301, at 2. R
309 Id. at 11.
310 Justin Akers Chaco´n, Out from the Shadows, Into the Street: The New Immigrant Civil
Rights Movement, 47 INT’L SOCIALIST REV. (2006), available at http://www.isreview.org/
issues/47/newmovement.shtml.
311 Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 295, at 1198-99. R
312 Id. at 1215.
313 Id. at 1218.
314 Id. at 1219.
315 See NGAI, supra note 106, at 63 (noting the “discontinuity between illegal immigration R
as an abstract general problem, a ‘scare’ discourse used at times to great political effect, and
illegal immigrants who were real people known in the community, people who committed no
substantive wrongs”).
316 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
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alleged fears of sanctions when retaliating against workers,318 and permitting
states to pass their own laws and programs to verify employment eligibil-
ity,319 they counter crossed categorization and contribute to intergroup bias.
Immigration reforms that eliminate these harmful policies and protect immi-
grants’ rights as workers would therefore help promote crossed categoriza-
tion and social cohesion.
b. Student-Based Identities
Just as undocumented immigrants have been organizing around their
identities as workers rather than focusing on their immigration status, un-
documented youth have highlighted their social identities as students in cam-
paigns to obtain in-state tuition, access to financial aid, legalization under
the DREAM Act and other types of immigration reform.320  These types of
campaigns may be even more effective at promoting crossed categorization
than organizing around worker-based identities because students and immi-
grants remain cognitively distinct categories, whereas workers in certain
low-wage industries often overlap with immigrants in the public’s imagina-
tion and in reality.321
Energized by the massive immigrants’ rights marches that swept across
the nation in March 2006, immigrant youth have remained a vital force in
advocacy around immigration reform.322  They have engaged in highly visi-
ble forms of direct actions such as appearing at graduation ceremonies with
bound hands and tape over their mouths to protest how immigration laws
silence talented students, collectively walking out of schools, and participat-
ing in hunger strikes and vigils.323  They have also presented to Congress
testimonios that promote “the destabilization of boundaries of exclusion
317 See Wishnie, supra note 131. R
318 Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 295, at 1233. R
319 Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011) (holding, inter alia, that an
Arizona law’s requirement that every employer verify the employment eligibility of hired em-
ployees through a specific Internet-based system did not conflict with federal law). See also
City of Hazelton v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011) (remanding to the Third Circuit pursuant
to Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting).
320 See, e.g., Roberto G. Gonzales, Left Out But Not Shut Down: Political Activism and the
Undocumented Student Movement, 3 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 219 (2008); Leisy Abrego, Legit-
imacy, Social Identity, and the Mobilization of Law: The Effects of Assembly Bill 540 on the
Undocumented Students in California, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 709 (2008).
321 Gordon and Lenhardt note that “in a range of industries – food processing, janitorial,
and hotel work among them – the past few decades have seen a shift from a workforce with
strong African American representation to one that is predominantely immigrant.”  Gordon
and Lenhardt, supra note 294, at 1173.  They explain that “work in which [racially stigma-
tized] groups engage is often devalued simply because it is people of color rather than Whites
who are doing it; the social value of a job turns not only on the citizenship status but the racial
classifications of those who carry it out.” Id. at 1199.
322 Randal C. Archibold, Immigrants Take to the Streets in Show of Strength, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 2006, at A1; Teresa Watanabe & Hector Becerra, 500,000 Pack Streets to Protest
Immigration Bills, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, at A1.
323 Roberto G. Gonzales, Left Out But Not Shut Down: Political Activism and the Undocu-
mented Student Movement, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 219 (2008).
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based on illegality and the dismantling of pejorative identities associated
with the term ‘illegal alien.’” 324  Undocumented students who participate in
advocacy efforts develop “a political voice and identity” that help overcome
“the social stigma and silencing of undocumented status”325 and “[disrupt]
the regime of enforced invisibility that positions undocumented immigrants
as a subordinate group of anonymous manual laborers who lack the capacity
of other types of human action, such as political activity.”326
An example of the powerful impact of creating a student-based identity
is the movement of undocumented youth who organized around California
Assembly Bill 540, which allowed all long-term California residents to re-
ceive in-state tuition, regardless of immigration status.327  Before the passage
of AB 540, the undocumented youth that Leisy Abrego interviewed “ex-
pressed a sense of stigma and embarrassment that derived from being un-
documented,” as “their status was a constant reminder that they were
different, vulnerable, and considered suspect.”328  AB 540 granted these un-
documented youth a “legitimate space – inside colleges and universities –
where, as students, they are valued and ‘legitimate’ members of society.”329
The law gave them “a new, neutral, and more socially acceptable label that
subsequently changed their social identity and their potential for collective
action and further claims-making.”330  By identifying as “AB 540 students,”
undocumented youth dissociated themselves from negative labels such as
“illegals,” emphasized their status as students, and thereby achieved greater
social acceptance in a country that celebrates individual merit and education
as the path to upward mobility.331
While Abrego does not challenge the way that the undocumented youth
in her study embraced the “myth of meritocracy,” and focused instead on its
positive impact on their lives,332 others have explicitly criticized organizing
efforts that endorse this myth.  Some commentators, for example, have criti-
qued how “proponents of legislation such as the DREAM Act have made
their case by touting examples of exceedingly high achieving undocumented
students, such as high school valedictorians and start athletes,” and have
argued that such stories help make the case for “wasted talent” but at the
324 Rene Galindo, Embodying the Gap Between National Inclusion and Exclusion: The
“Testimonios” of Three Undocumented Students at a 2007 Congressional Hearing, 14 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 377, 379 (2011).
325 Id. at 380.
326 Id. at 382.
327 Abrego, supra note 320, at 723.
328 Id. at 723.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id; see also id. at 721 (“By submitting to the myth of meritocracy, students are able to
establish a sense of legitimacy despite their status as immigration outlaws.  Their legal con-
sciousness, powerfully informed by meritocratic principles, allows them to reinterpret their
lives and their social standing in U.S. society.”).
332 Id. at 711.
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same time exclude undocumented children who do not make it to college.333
Focusing on star students “move[s[ the discussion away from one of rights
to an argument based on ideals of meritocracy and reward,” and thus con-
tributes to the notion of “‘deserving’ vs. ‘undeserving’” immigrants.334  Sim-
ilarly, scholars contend that emphasizing a DREAM Act of limited
applicability that would aid only exceptional students fails to address the
more general exploitation of undocumented immigrants.335
Such arguments raise the same concern about creating new outgroups
through insufficiently inclusive reforms that was discussed above regarding
recategorization.  Abrego’s study conveys an important message about the
power of crossed categorization to transform not just external perceptions,
but internal ones as well.  This study shows that crossed categorization not
only changed public perception of undocumented youth, but also trans-
formed their own legal consciousness.  Instead of standing “against the law”
as stigmatized “illegal aliens” and feeling entrapped in a system where re-
sistance seemed futile, undocumented youth who created a new, neutral so-
cial identity for themselves by identifying as “AB 540 students” shifted
their legal consciousness to being “with the law.”336  Thus, this case study
provides an excellent example of the law’s power to shape both social iden-
tity and legal consciousness.
The shift in social identity that AB 540 produced suggests that other
reforms aimed to improve access to education for undocumented youth and
thereby highlight their status as students would effectively promote crossed
categorization.  The Supreme Court has guaranteed undocumented youth ac-
cess to a public elementary education but has not addressed access to higher
education.337  Some states have outright precluded undocumented students
from attending public colleges and universities, and required these institu-
tions to inquire about their students’ legal statuses, while other states have
been more supportive.338  By passing laws that allow undocumented youth to
attend public institutions of higher education, obtain financial aid and re-
ceive in-state tuition, federal and state governments would promote a power-
ful form of crossed categorization.
333 Shannon Gleeson & Roberto Gonzales, Wasted Talent and Hard Work: An Evaluation
of Framing in the Immigrant Rights Movement, Paper presented at the Law and Society Asso-
ciation Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL (May 29, 2010), available at http://citation.allacadem
ic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/4/0/7/0/0/p407001_index.html?phpsessid=1a1a28f
da0828616a647c79e76eac946 (abstract).
334 Id.
335 Juan Ibarra-Flores, Dreams Denied: Undocumented Students in the University, Paper
presented at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL (May 29, 2010),
available at https://www.zotero.org/groups/education_for_undocumented_hispanics/items/
itemKey/NMAU6EHJ#./NMAU6EHJ?&_suid=133255576235505179132619366994
(abstract).
336 Abrego, supra note 320, at 729.
337 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
338 Neither PRWORA nor IIRIRA prohibit public universities from admitting undocu-
mented immigrants, and most states permit them to enroll. See supra note 33.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that research in social categorization and in cat-
egorization-based strategies for reducing intergroup bias provides a useful
framework for analyzing the impact of U.S. immigration policies.  Each of
the strategies discussed above – decategorization, recategorization, and
crossed categorization – serves as a novel lens for examining how particular
immigration policies potentially impact intergroup relations.  Discussions of
comprehensive immigration reform have generally failed to consider immi-
gration policies from these points of view.  Such discussions have centered
on how many and what kinds of immigrants to admit, instead of focusing on
how to create a climate conducive to social cohesion rather than conflict.
While there are numerous challenges to eroding category boundaries, rede-
fining them more inclusively, or drawing attention to multiple categories of
social identity, this Article identifies positive steps being taken in each of
these directions and suggests different ways to promote each categorization-
based strategy in the context of immigration reform.
The proposed reforms represent modest ways to use law as a tool to
deconstruct the category of “illegal aliens” as a social identity and move
towards a more cohesive society.  More dramatic proposals for reform also
exist to achieve these same goals.  For example, a much more sweeping ap-
proach to decategorization could involve creating open borders and voiding
status-based categories altogether.339 “Open admissions policies would . . .
assist in promoting full community membership for all people living and
working in U.S. society.”340  This approach involves outright erasure of cate-
gory boundaries rather than the slow erosion of these boundaries in the man-
ner discussed above.
Similarly, in considering different approaches to recategorization, we
should not allow national borders to constrain our imaginations. A growing
body of scholarship delinks the concepts of citizenship and nationality, and
turns instead to ideas such as “global citizenship,” “transnational citizen-
ship” and “postnational citizenship.”341 The emergence of European citizen-
ship, the formalization of a shared European cultural identity, provides one
example of a superordinate identity that transgresses national borders and
339 Only a few fearless legal scholars have seriously examined this “taboo subject . . .
[that] has been the political kiss of death for serious immigration reformers.”  Kevin R. John-
son, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 196 (2003).  Johnson’s arguments that open bor-
ders would reduce racial discrimination, prevent exploitation of workers, promote integration
of immigrants into U.S. society, and reduce international tensions are all completely consistent
with the concept of decategorization as a way to reduce intergroup bias. Id. at 244-60.  Indeed,
he specifically notes that “[l]egal distinctions between immigrants and citizens . . . serve to
create in-groups and out-groups, promote interethnic tension, and breed discrimination against
perceived outsiders.” Id. at 255; see also Mark Tushnet, Open Borders, in A COMMUNITY OF
EQUALS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF NEW AMERICANS (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers
eds., 1999).
340 Johnson, supra note 339, at 255. R
341 See Bosniak, supra note 254, at 449.
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highlights the goal of social cohesion.342  The proposal to create a North
American Union modeled after the European Union similarly has roots in
the desire for greater social cohesion, for “a more integrated North
America.”343
Social psychologists have found that a superordinate European identity
can, in fact, act as a buffer to bias and reduce xenophobia, if the subgroups
feel committed to the shared identity and find it meaningful.344 Whether the
creation of a North American Union could have the same impact is an issue
that merits further research.345 This brief discussion of supranational superor-
dinate identities simply highlights that we should not confine our thinking to
small-scale reforms when considering potential categorization-based strate-
gies for reducing bias.
Social categorization theories provide new insight into how the catego-
ries that we create through our immigration laws shape our identity as a
nation.  The categorization-based strategies set forth in this Article provide a
coherent framework and methodology for analyzing past, present, and future
immigration policies with respect to their impact on social cohesion.  This
Article represents an initial effort to apply this framework to a limited set of
policies and to make some recommendations.  Further research in this area
would not only help develop ideas about how best to combine various types
of immigration policies to reduce social bias, but could also generate innova-
tive proposals for comprehensive immigration reform.
342 Id. at 483, 486. Policy-makers actively and consciously constructed this superordinate
European identity.  As Stephen Zamora notes, the EU’s website contains “a cornucopia of . . .
inspirational pronouncements (‘Europe is fun!’), and promotional calls for unification, peace
and harmony,” and communicates in “a language sometimes referred to as ‘Eurospeak’” that
includes pet terms such as “social cohesion.” Stephen Zamora, A Proposed North American
Regional Development Fund: The Next Phase of North American Integration Under NAFTA,
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